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iAbstract
Applications and services in distributed environments are an increasingly
important topic. Hence approaches to security issues in such applications
are also becoming essential. Crucial information is needed to be protected
properly and mechanisms must be developed for this protection.
Access control is one of the topics that underline security problems. It
concerns assuring that data or resources are accessed by the correct entities.
A commonly used access control approach is called access control lists, which
is widely applied in most operating systems. However, this approach has
some weaknesses with regard to scalability, and so it is not very suitable for
distributed environments that usually have variable populations. Capabilities
on the other hand offer scalability and adaptability advantages over access
control lists. Capabilities are unforgeable tickets that can be propagated
between entities, and fit well in distributed environments. But capabilities
also have limits due to their simple structure. They grant infinite number of
accesses for given types of actions, but are not able to capture sequences and
branches of actions, which may be called ‘aspects of behaviours’.
In this thesis, behaviour control approaches are introduced, through Vis-
tas to Treaties. Vistas can provide explicit access control for each component
of objects, and provide primitive control over action sequences. Treaties de-
velop behaviour control further by containing behaviour descriptors which
can specify those sequencing, branching and terminating aspects, and hence
can provide much finer control over behaviours. Because treaties inherit the
scalable attributes of capabilities, they also fit well in distributed environ-
ments.
An interesting feature in treaty systems is that they allow users to re-
fine the specifications of behaviours and generate new treaties from existing
ii
ones. A number of treaty combinator operations are proposed to realize this
functionality, and they are shown to be safe with respect to the security of
access control.
A novel issue created by the treaty approach is identified in the thesis.
The new problem is called the duplication problem, which could cause users
being able to gain more permissions than they should have by making copies
of unprotected treaties. Any treaty systems must provide solutions to this
problem. Three models which solve the duplication problem are proposed,
with an analysis of their differences, and advantages and disadvantages.
Treaties are a general concept and in real cases they can be represented
in various ways. There are components in treaties that have given a variety
of implementation options, and the developers of services and applications
can choose to combine these options to fit their special requirements. This
makes treaties more flexible and adaptable.
The implementations of concreted treaties and treaty systems are intro-
duced, and these implemented treaties are used to test their behaviour con-
trol abilities. Evaluations for different treaty representations are provided to
compare their performance. Scalability of treaty systems is also evaluated,
showing that treaties are good to be deployed in distributed environments.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Approaches to Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Distributed Environments: the Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2 Background 11
2.1 Capabilities vs ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Issues of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Uses of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5 Modifications of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Limitations of Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 Session Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3 Vistas 33
3.1 Vista Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Vista Combinator Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3 Use-Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
iii
iv CONTENTS
4 Treaty Concepts 49
4.1 What Treaties Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.1.1 Terms and Definitions in Treaty Systems . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Operations and the Rule of Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.1 The Five Basic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2.2 Using Behaviour Sets to Prove Correctness of Operations 60
4.2.3 Laws of Treaty Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2.4 A Use-Case Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3 Novel Issues Generated by Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
5 Representations of Treaties 75
5.1 Object Referencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.2 Behaviour Descriptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.2.1 Finite-State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.2 Regular Expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.2.3 Process Algebra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.3 Storage Location of Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.3.1 Centrally Stored Treaties and References . . . . . . . . 82
5.3.2 User-held Treaties and Treaty Entries . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.4 Operations and Executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4.1 More Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.2 Command Executions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.5 An Example of Organized Treaty Representation . . . . . . . 91
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6 Implementation 99
6.1 Implementation Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.2 FSMs as Behaviour Descriptors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
6.2.1 System Components and Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
CONTENTS v
6.2.2 FSM Accessors and Access Methods . . . . . . . . . . 104
6.2.3 Treaty Operations in the FSM Representation . . . . . 105
6.3 Regular Expressions as Behaviour Descriptors . . . . . . . . . 114
6.3.1 Classes and Field Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.3.2 RE Accessors and Access Methods . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.3.3 Treaty Operations in the RE Representation . . . . . . 119
6.4 Other Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4.1 Classes and Field Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.4.2 Methods in Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7 Evaluation 131
7.1 Evaluation of Behaviour Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
7.2 Evaluation of Time Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.2.1 Access Time for Capabilities, Vistas and Treaties . . . 134
7.2.2 Time Cost for Stages of Using Treaties . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2.3 Evaluating Treaty Combinator Operations . . . . . . . 140
7.3 Evaluation in a Distributed Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.3.1 Models towards Duplication Problem . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.3.2 Scalability of Treaty Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
8 Conclusion 157
8.1 The Proposed Work and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.2.1 Behaviour Pattern Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.2.2 Reducing Parameters of Target Object . . . . . . . . . 162
8.2.3 Non-deterministic Problem and Semaphore-like Scheme 163
8.3 Coda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
vi CONTENTS
List of Figures
2.1 Example Capabilities for a file f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Actual referencing relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Using Caretakers to Solve the Revocation Problem . . . . . . 21
3.1 An Illustration of How Vistas Refer to Objects . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Process of Applying Multiple Targets Aspect . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3 Difference Between Using a Set of Vistas and a Summed Vista 43
3.4 Users Holding Different Vistas Access to a Same Object . . . . 45
4.1 Structure of Capabilities and Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 An example of the Structure of a Treaty-based System . . . . 56
4.3 Graphical Illustration of Binary Treaty Operations . . . . . . 59
4.4 Behaviour Models for a Timed Voting System . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Two Cases that may Cause Duplication Problem . . . . . . . 70
5.1 Structure of a Centrally Stored Treaty System . . . . . . . . . 83
5.2 Structure of a Treaty System with Entry List . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3 Two-Layered FSM Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Referencing Structure between Two Categories of Treaties . . 94
6.1 FSM Treaty classes in UML form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.2 Illustration of Binary Treaty Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
vii
viii LIST OF FIGURES
6.3 Process of the Restrict Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4 RE Treaty classes in UML form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.1 Times for successful accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM
Treaties and RE Treaties with a Single Action . . . . . . . . . 135
7.2 Times for failed accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM Treaties
and RE Treaties with a Single Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.3 Times for successful accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM
Treaties and RE Treaties with 10 Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.4 Refining a Complete Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.5 Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in FSM Representation Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.6 Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in RE Representation Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.7 Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in both Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.8 Time Consumption for Operations in FSM represented Treaties141
7.9 Time Consumption for Operations in RE represented Treaties 141
7.10 Time Consumption for Operations in RE represented Treaties 142
7.11 Time Consumption for Join in RE represented Treaties . . . . 142
7.12 Time Consumption for Concatenate Operations . . . . . . . . 144
7.13 Time Consumption for Join Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
7.14 Time Consumption for Intersect Operations . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.15 Time Consumption for Difference Operations . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.16 Time Consumption for Restrict Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.17 Example of Voting System Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.18 Time Consumption while Number of Users Changes . . . . . . 148
7.19 Time Consumption while Number of Kernels Changes . . . . . 148
7.20 Space Consumption Comparison in Small Scaled Case . . . . . 150
LIST OF FIGURES ix
7.21 Space Consumption Comparison in Larger Scaled Case . . . . 150
7.22 Average Time Consumption per Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7.23 Kernel Memory Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
x LIST OF FIGURES
List of Tables
2.1 Example ACL for a file f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Reference Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.1 Four Basic Vista Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1 Formal Definitions for Treaty Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.1 Behaviour Control Evaluation when Malicious Users Exist . . 133
xi
xii LIST OF TABLES
Acknowledgments
As this PhD thesis comes to the stage of consummation, I would like to
look back to the path I walked on, and express my gratitude to all the people
who gave me plenty of help. I would never have a chance to enjoy my success
without you:
 Dr. Alan Wood, my supervisor. Alan gave me the inspiration for my
work, guided me throughout the course of the research, showed me
different skills and techniques, encouraged me when I felt perturbed,
and provided help when I met academic or living problems. There was
always a warm welcome when I knocked on his door. It is impossible
for me to fully express my gratitude to him.
 Dr. Jeremy Jacob and Manuel Oriol who were my internal examiners.
They gave me much support, especially the experience of being ques-
tioned, and hence trained me to be better in explaining and presenting
my research.
 Prof. Simon Dobson who was my external examiner. His kindness
encouraged me a lot, and his comments and suggestions have shown
me how I should improve myself.
 Prof. Colin Runciman who took care of me during the period that
my supervisor was away from the department. Colin guided me from
a different point of view and approach to my research so that I could
expand my vision.
 All members of the PLASMA (Programming Languages and Systems)
research group. The warm atmosphere and academic discussions always
pushed me forward on my path.
 All members and staff in the Department of Computer Science and the
University of York that have ever provided various academic, technical
and living assistance to me.
 My father Zhao Hong and my mother Huang Lili. They not only raised
me up, guided me how to be a good human being, but also provided
the financial support during my student years. I can always feel their
love for me, and here I want to say the words that I have rarely said
because of my introversion: I love you both.
 My relatives, friends, teachers, tutors, classmates, workmates. You will
share my memories all my life.
 Finally, my fiance´e Zheng Xiaxing. Thank you for your company and
patience. I love you.
Declaration
This work is solely that of author, except where cited otherwise. Some
parts of the thesis are based on other published work by the author, listed
as follows:
1. Parts of Chapter 3 have been published in Proceedings of Euro-Par
2010 Parallel Processing Workshops, Lecture Notes in Coputer Science
6586, September 2010 [72].
2. The initial ideas in Chapter 4 and 5 have been published in Proceedings
of 2nd Annual International Conference on Advances in Distributed and
Parallel Computing, September 2011 [76].
3. Parts of Section 4.2.2 and 7.2.2 have been published in Proceedings of
The 2012 International Conference on Control Engineering and Com-
munication Technology, December 2012 [77].
4. Parts of Section 5.3, 5.5 and 7.3.1 have been published in Proceedings
of The Thirteenth International Conference on Parallel and Distributed
Computing, Applications and Technologies, December 2012 [78]. An
extended version of this paper including contents in Section 7.3.2 has
been submitted to the journal of Computer Science and Information
Systems (ComSIS).

Chapter 1
Introduction
Access control is an important concept in computer science. It provides safety
for different users when accessing resources in systems. In the early days of
computer science, programs and resources were only available to individual
users, hence there was little need to restrict users’ access to resources —
they were simply the owner of those resources. But as the systems evolved,
programs and resources that were visible to multiple users appeared. These
new applications encourage communication and coordination among users in
systems, but this introduces the new problem of controlling users’ actions,
based on their identities. Hence access control concepts were developed as
solutions for the problem. In most access control schemes users have to first
provide their identities to a central authority, and then the authority (which
we may also call the kernel) would decide to allow or deny the access request.
However, as systems grow even larger and more complex, the populations
of users also increase greatly, and the structure of systems change. Simple
access control schemes cannot keep up with the development of these systems,
thus new ideas are proposed by researchers for providing more sophisticated
functionalities to guarantee the security of systems. This work is part of this
trend. The thesis introduces a finer control approach aiming towards the
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control of behaviours in distributed environments. These behaviours include
predefined sequences of actions and repetitions of executions for some type
of actions. The improvement is made by changing the data structure in
the capability approach for access control. This work is concerned more
about system structure and organization than authentication, verification or
validation.
In the following sections, we will introduce the general ideas of access
control, pointing out the limitations that appear in traditional access control
approaches that motivate our research. This introduction concludes with an
outline of the thesis, briefly explaining each chapter.
1.1 Approaches to Access Control
Access control “constrains what a user can do directly, as well as what pro-
grams executing on behalf of the users are allowed to do. In this way access
control seeks to prevent activity that could lead to breach of security” [56].
In principle, access control works by specifying which user can do what ac-
tions on the resources. It is important to note that access control itself is not
enough for securing systems from invalid accesses, since it has to be com-
bined with other security services. A key area of security schemes that needs
to be provided other than access control, is authentication, which allows the
kernels to ensure the sender of a request is the actual entity that it declares
itself to be. Authentication is necessary before access control happens, be-
cause access control initially works with the identity of the requester, and it
has to assume that the identity has been correctly verified by the authenti-
cation mechanism. Moreover, the whole process needs audit control, which
will record and analyse the actions taken by users to observe any adverse
behaviours.
Traditional access control is based on the identity of each user who re-
Chapter 1. Introduction 3
quires access to files or objects. In such schemes each object needs to hold
the information for all users that would access it, explicitly defining all valid
action types that each user is allowed to perform. This works fine if the scale
of the system is small, and it provides a very strict and precise control cov-
ering all resources for all users. However, when the applications grow larger
and more complex, it is hard to maintain explicit access control information
for all users. In a system there might be applications that are available to a
number of users, and they have different roles that define different responsi-
bilities and different privileges. It would be infeasible for each object to hold
access control information for a large number of users individually, and to
maintain the same information for users in the same roles would be a redun-
dancy for the system. New requirements appear as systems evolve [63]. As
a result of these considerations, Role-Based Access Control schemes [55, 21]
emerged.
Role-based access control (RBAC) splits users of an application into sev-
eral groups, each of which carries a different role for the application. Each
role takes a different responsibility and hence different access rights. With
role-based access control, the administrator of the system can simply define a
number of roles and assign different permissions according these roles. When
new users are added into the system and passed the authentication, they
will be specified as belonging to a certain role according to their identity,
and gain the appropriate permissions. Now, with such a scheme, each object
or application in the system only needs to hold the access control informa-
tion for a small number of roles instead of the large number of users, thus
saving the kernel’s load greatly. Although role-based access control loses the
individuality of users to some extent, it is still a very suitable model for man-
agement in companies and organizations, therefore it has become the major
option in the area of access control.
Original access control schemes and the RBAC approach are all based on
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central control, as they strongly rely on kernels to administrate the access
control information. The most widely used approach in centralized access
control is the Access Control List, which implies having kernels possess lists
of users or user groups, and defining access permissions for objects for each
of the users/groups. As the access control lists adopt the centralized con-
trol model, where all the information is strictly managed by kernels, it can
strongly guarantee the security of the whole process of accesses. Hence the
access control list approach is applied by most services and applications which
involve access control, including hardware, middleware and software.
1.2 Distributed Environments: the Motiva-
tion
The access control introduced in the previous section faces more challenges
when systems become even larger and more complex. In recent years, services
and applications in distributed environments [2, 68] have become popular
and widely used. Distributed environments may include many different ar-
eas, such as parallel computing, distributed computing and cloud computing.
Applications in these environments could have a very large number of partic-
ipants or active processes, and these entities can communicate with others.
Meanwhile, the growth of the population of users causes the workload of
kernels to increase dramatically as well. It is much more difficult to upgrade
the performance of a single kernel/server device than to increase the number
of kernels/servers, as there will be a limit to the maximum performance of
single chips due to physical limitations. Hence the option of distributing the
kernels and users in the systems becomes necessary. All these make strictly
centralized control unfit for modern computer developments, since the pop-
ulation of users in such environments (especially open systems) is extremely
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variable: there are always new users joining the systems and other users quit-
ing. The changes of users are so frequent that it is very difficult to have the
kernels manage these changes — the maintenance of user lists becomes too
expensive. On the other hand, traditional access control using centralization
is suitable for managements in companies and organizations, but nowadays
individual-oriented services and applications (which means their purpose is to
serve each individual user) are becoming more and more important. The lack
of individuality in RBAC makes it hard to adapt the requirements of these
applications. Therefore, a different approach to access control, capabilities,
has shown its attractiveness.
Capabilities [56] are another access control technique. The major differ-
ence between capabilities and centralized access controls is that capabilities
are held by users. They are only presented to kernels when the holder of a
capability wants to access resources. Hence, kernels no longer need to main-
tain access control information for each user, but only to check the validity
of capabilities when they are shown. Thus this approach reduces the load on
kernels greatly. Moreover, capabilities can be propagated among users with-
out the necessity of notifying kernels. This makes the capability approach
more dynamic in spreading the permissions for resources than centralized
access control approaches, and is particularly suitable in distributed envi-
ronments. We will introduce the capability ideas and their advantages and
drawbacks in detail in Chapter 2.
Although capabilities show some attractive properties for access control
in distributed environments, there are still aspects that could (and should)
be improved. In capabilities there are only independent permissions. They
cannot, for instance, define specific sequences of actions. In real cases we
often have to do things in a number of steps, and the order of these steps
cannot be altered. These ordered actions constitute procedures, or what
we call the behaviours. Simple capabilities cannot specify the control of
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behaviours in the way that centralized access control could, where the kernels
could define and change the valid permissions for users or user groups, as all
access control information is held by kernels. However, in the capability
approach access control information is stored in capabilities that are held by
users, hence it is difficult for kernels to control the sequence of user actions
in the same way as centralized control. To provide behaviour control in
distributed environments, we need further research and development, and
that is the main motivation for the work presented in this thesis.
In this work, we will explore the capability approach to access control
in distributed environments, and propose new ideas and approaches that
can cope with the behaviour control aspect addressed above. The develop-
ment of behaviour control in our research is divided into Vistas and Treaties,
which aim towards a finer behaviour control. Vistas extend the capabil-
ity approach by splitting the control to per-attributes and per-functions in
the target resource, and Treaties provide finer behaviour control by specify-
ing the sequences, branches and terminations of actions to target resources.
There are new security problems that arise from the components in the new
approaches, and possible solutions are presented to overcome these problems.
1.3 Contributions
The main goal of this work is to develop new approaches for coping with
behaviour control in distributed environments. The approaches of Vistas
and Treaties are proposed that aim to provide the functionality of behaviour
control. In this thesis we present the following:
 The concept of Vistas and Treaties, how they are structurally evolved
from capabilities, and why these evolutions are beneficial.
 Combinator Operations for vistas, and for treaties, which form new
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access control and behaviour control specifications. These operations
provide the functionality of allowing users to refine their behaviour
specification after the vistas or treaties are produced, and hence further
increase the dynamic control over accesses and behaviours.
 A proof of the correctness of treaty combinator operations using the
idea of behaviour sets that shows that refining treaties with treaty
operations will not destroy the safety of behaviour control.
 A new issue called the duplication problem arising from the behaviour
control approaches, suggesting solutions that solve this problem. The
performance of the candidate solutions for the duplication problem are
also tested and compared.
 The various implementation options for treaties and treaty systems
that allow developers and service providers to satisfy their particular
requirements.
 Implementation examples of capabilities, vistas and treaties. We have
realized the functionality of behaviour controls and the refinement of
behaviour specifications using treaty operations, have evaluated the
correctness of behaviour control using treaties, and have evaluated the
computational requirements for implemented treaty components. Fi-
nally, we have evaluated the scalability of treaty systems to show the
practicality of treaties.
1.4 Thesis Organization
Here the content of each chapter will be briefly introduced by their organi-
zations, providing an overall view of the thesis.
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Background In this chapter the required knowledge will be introduced.
The major content of this chapter will be an examination of the access
control schemes and especially capabilities, which are an access con-
trol approach that is particularly suitable to be applied in distributed
environments. The advantages and disadvantages of capabilities will
be discussed, and we point out the limitation that capabilities do not
provide adequate behaviour control.
Vistas This chapter will propose an approach called Vistas that extends the
idea of capabilities, and provides a finer access control scheme. We show
the extra functionalities of combining vistas with defined operations,
and suggest some use-cases that would benefit from vistas. Vistas show
progress towards behaviour control but which is still not precise enough,
thus indicating that further development is needed.
Treaty Concepts The ideas of capabilities and vistas are extended further
to Treaties in this chapter. We introduce the concepts, definitions and
structures of treaties in an abstract way. Like Vistas, Treaties also
have combinator operations to change the specifications of behaviours.
There emerges a new issue that treaties cause, called the duplication
problem. We discuss the reasons and the situations that might cause
this problem.
Representations of Treaties This chapter discusses treaties in a more
concrete way. Several components of treaties and treaty systems can
have different implementation options that can be chosen by developers
and service providers to satisfy their special requirements. An example
of a complete treaty system implementation is shown in the chapter,
in which all options have been fixed.
Implementation In this chapter the way the behaviour control scheme of
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
treaties is implemented using Java is presented. We introduce compo-
nents of treaties and systems to be implemented as classes, and some
of the field values and methods are also discussed. The key algorithms
of treaty combinator operations are illustrated by pseudo-code.
Evaluation We evaluate our treaty systems according to their integrity on
behaviour control, their time and space consumption, and their scal-
ability in distributed environments. The efficiency of combinator op-
erations in Finite-State Machine (FSM) and Regular Expression (RE)
representations are compared, and the performance of different models
to solve the duplication problem are also evaluated.
Conclusion This chapter reviews the whole thesis and emphasizes the es-
sential contents. It addresses the contribution of this work again, and
discusses topics that have not been included in this thesis but could be
a good direction for future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter the background and literiture that contributes relevant knowl-
edge is presented. A main area to be introduced is Capabilities that are a
dynamic access control approach for distributed environments. We will look
at the positives and negatives that the capability approach brings, and differ-
ent uses and modifications that are applied on capabilities for various cases.
It also suggest the limitations which indicate the need for further researches.
2.1 Capabilities vs ACLs
The prime work of this project will largely be based on the idea of capabilities.
The term capability in the context of computer science generally refers to
object access control. The concept was invented several decades ago, and the
debate on the applicability and effectiveness of capabilities has also lasted for
a long period. Therefore, to illustrate the proposed working directions of the
project, it is necessary to look at the concept of capabilities and capability-
related research work.
In the context of security systems in computer science, the word ‘capa-
bility’ means a particular approach to address and protect data or resources.
11
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user Read Write eXecute
Alice - - -
Bob
√
-
√
Carol
√ √ √
David - -
√
Table 2.1: Example ACL for a file f
The main classification of this approach is access control. In the traditional
methods of access control, the most commonly used approach is the Access
Control List (ACL), whose variants have been applied to Unix and many
other systems [70, 10]. This mechanism is implemented by attaching an ac-
cess rights list to items of data, each list specifying the particular access
rights for every user or process in the system. These lists are used to inform
the kernel whether an action to a file, say, from a user is valid. Table 2.1
shows an example of an access control list for an individual file. Assume
this list has been applied to file f, then any access from Alice to f will be
denied, and any access from Carol is allowed. David only has the permission
to execute while modification from Bob is invalid.
The capability approach also provides an access control mechanism be-
tween users and data, but it does this the other way: instead of attaching
the access control information on the data side, capabilities are stored on
the user’s device or storage spaces. Capabilities are unforgable keys that are
created by the kernel, and can be passed among users or processes. They are
not allowed to be modified, but reproduction is legal [46]. In the classical
approach a capability contains two major parts: a reference to the particular
data item, and a set of access rights that this capability is granting. The
use of capabilities acts like ticket verification. Suppose in a capability based
system there is a user or process that wants to read a file f, it must possess
a capability c which has the reference to f, and in c the read right is in the
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rights set. Then the user or process may hand the capability c to the kernel
and tell it that it want to access file f with a read operation. After the
kernel has checked the validity of c (that it is not forged) and the read right
is in the set of access rights, this read action can be allowed and performed.
Fig. 2.1 shows the capability approach in the same case of that in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Example Capabilities for a file f
The key difference of the capability approach from the ACL approach is
that, these capability objects are possessed by the subjects (users or pro-
cesses), and subjects are responsible for propagating capabilities. Initially,
a capability c is created by the kernel when a new file f is created, and the
kernel will pass this capability c to the creator of the new file. Usually the
new capability c contains the full set of access rights to file f at this stage.
Then, if the creator of the file wants to share f with other users or processes,
it can pass a capability c′ referencing for f to others. This capability c′ is
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generated from c. They have the same reference to f, but the set of rights
in c′ can be either the same as that in c, or it can be a subset. Then other
subjects having c′ can also pass capability c′′ generated from c′ to others, and
so on. The information contained in capabilities is visible to their possessors,
so that the possessors know what access actions are valid to them.
The original capability idea came from Dennis and Van Horn’s work back
in the mid 1960s, and it was illustrated in their work [17]. Although this
paper has been widely recognized as the introduction of the capability idea,
it is in fact not purely about this, and the capability concept is rather like
a by-product. In the paper the authors discussed the Multiprogrammed
Computation System (MCS), which is a kind of operating system related to
programming and concurrency. Dennis and Van Horn used capabilities as
the addressing and protection tool. In an MCS there are many processes
running at the same time, and each process should have a list of capabilities
called a C-list. Capabilities in the C-list contain all references to the data
or computing objects that the process needs. It also contains the set of
access rights of combinations of readable, writeable and executable. The
paper defines a computation as “a set of processes having a common C-
list such that all processes using that same C-list are members of the same
computation”. In other words it is the group of processes computing over
the same objects. Capabilities are used here to protect data from incorrect
or meaningless modification. If any process wants to write over a piece of
data D through some routine, there must be the capability in its C-list that
shows the validity of writing D.
There are some important rules that have been generally agreed. The
most significant one is that: one can never edit the contents of any capability.
This basic rule shall always be applied. Two major principles are contained
in the rule. First, the possessor of capabilities cannot replace the references
to the object by other references. Second, one cannot increase, reduce or
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replace the rights in the set of rights part of capabilities. The behaviour of
increasing and replacing permissions are especially forbidden. The reason for
this rule is that if the possessor can replace the references in capabilities, he
is able to easily access an object to which he has only restricted actions by
creating a new object with full permissions and change the reference of the
new object to the restricted object. Similarly forbidden in the behaviour of
changing set of rights, as the possessor could increase the available access
rights which go beyond the level issued by the kernel. Although reducing the
rights in a capability seems to do no harm to the capability system, it is an
action that brings no benefits to the holder of this capability, thus this can
also be omitted.
However, capabilities can be changed to generate new capabilities, and
these are referred as operations on capabilities. The set of rights in a ca-
pability can be increased in case of its possessor also having another valid
capability referring to the same object, and has some issued rights that are
not in the first capability. We call this a combination of capabilities. The
new capability generated by the combining operation results in a reference
to the object that the two combining capabilities both pointed to, and a set
of rights that is the union of the right sets of the two combining capabil-
ities. This combination operation is useful when the possessor gained two
capabilities from two paths or at different times.
Another valid capability operation is subtraction. This operation can be
performed from any capability that does not have an empty set of rights. The
capability derived by a subtraction operation contains the reference pointing
to exactly the same object as the original capability, and a subset of the set of
rights from the original capability. This has no benefits to the holder himself,
but it can be used in a case when a user is willing to pass a capability to share
the object with others, but he does not want to give the full permissions that
he has to other users. With the subtraction operation, the possessor can
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keep the same capability he has and give a restricted version out.
The capability approach in general is just a concept. In practice, there
is more than one way to implement a capability model, and because of their
differences, they can be used in different applications.
A simple way of using the capability features without any complex mech-
anism is to follow the original invention, which is proposed in the original
work [17], in the age before object-oriented ideas had become popular. In
this style, capabilities are just a set of attribute values grouped together in
each process. There are no real organized structures defining capabilities,
and they are statically handled by processes themselves. To use a capability
the process needs to find out the correct attribute values among the locations
of all capabilities that are reachable, and understand what these data repre-
sent. This approach is appropriate for a closed system, where there are no
dramatic changes in computing processes, and processes and their executing
styles tend to be homogeneous. Otherwise it requires some interpreters to
work for the synchronization.
Another way of implementing capabilities, in a network environment, is to
adopt the ideas from network security: encryption. Gifford [25] introduced
the idea of sealing information using cryptography to enhance the secrecy
and authentication of the system. This is done by first generating a pair of
asymmetric keys, and the owner of the information uses one of the pair of
keys to encrypt the secrets as a ‘sealed’ object, and then places it in some
publicly accessible storage. Only by using the other key in that pair, the
information in the sealed object can be decrypted. Thus people possessing
the decryption key can read the information, while others will only get the
name and size of the object but nothing else. There are many operations
for combining and redirecting features that were introduced in the paper as
well, and these operations make this approach more feasible for information
sharing among multiple users having different key pairs. This cryptography
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can be implemented to apply for many different uses, including access control
lists, capabilities and information flow controls.
Treating capabilities as objects is a third way of representing the capa-
bility approach. This is applicable for those modern programming languages
with object-oriented features. Each capability is an object now, and we can
define capabilities using special class declarations with clear attribute values,
using different levels of protection over the functions to restrict the accessi-
bility to these field values. Because capabilities are actual objects in this way,
they can be passed among users and processes conveniently, so it really cor-
responds with the property of user propagation of the capability approach.
The accessibility of capability objects needs to be carefully defined. The users
and processes are allowed to do the combining or subtracting operations over
capabilities, but they are allowed neither to directly access the field values
that represent permissions, nor to change the validity of capabilities. In gen-
eral, the approach of treating capabilities as objects is quite appropriate for
open systems that have frequently changed population.
2.2 Issues of Capabilities
As has been mentioned, the major difference between the capability approach
and the ACL approach is the place where access control information is stored.
We can have a comparison between these two approaches and thus find the
advantages and disadvantages for each one.
In the ACL approach, the information is stored on the resource side, and
the kernel has complete knowledge for this. Every time a user comes up with
an access operation to a certain file, the kernel will check the access list of
that file to see if the user is on the list, and then to check if the operation type
has been granted to this user. The good point of this approach is the control
power of the kernel. The kernel can actively change the access information
18 Chapter 2. Background
and user groups, and this gives an easy control mode.
However, there is a problem with this: if an unknown user comes to the
system, any operations from him will be denied, as the user is not on the
access control lists. Therefore, to allow new users to join the system, it must
update all lists of all files every time the user set changes. It is clear to see that
the cost could be high, especially in systems where there is a big possibility
for changes of users. A common solution is to have user groups, which means
users can be divided into administrators, common members and visitors and
so on, and in the access control lists only these groups are recorded. When
new users join the system, the kernel can simply place them into the proper
group and there is no need to update ACLs. But this solution only deals with
a small number of groups, so it does not support a wide variety of users, and
thus is not fit for complex systems.
The capability approach on the other hand has the opposite features
compared with ACLs. Since capabilities themselves contain the access infor-
mation, they have been released from the control of kernel. The propagation
of the capabilities is the job of users, and the kernels need only do the work
of producing capabilities, passing them to the initial owners of the resources,
and checking the validity and issued permissions of the capabilities that are
handed in by users who require access to resources. It is clear that in this
approach the kernel side needs to know nothing about the users and their
changes. The entry and exit of users has no effect on the kernel’s operations,
thus a more dynamic system has been achieved, and the system structure
becomes more flexible.
The capability approach also has its own shortcomings. The supporters
on the ACL side argue that there are some major problems that the ca-
pability approach cannot overcome easily. First, people say that there are
usually many more resources or files than users, so to implement the capa-
bility approach means that every user or process has to maintain a huge list
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resource1 resource2
Alice
√ √
Bob
√
-
Carol -
√
Table 2.2: Reference Relations
of resource references, plus all issued permissions along each reference, and
this could be a space problem. Second, it is widely believed that capabilities
cannot enforce confinement [5, 39, 40]. The confinement problem refers to
how to prevent systems from leaking data to untrusted users or subjects.
Because the propagation of capabilities is managed by users, it cannot be
controlled by the kernel, so people worry that capabilities can go anywhere,
even to someone who is not trusted [44]. Another doubt over the capability
approach is called the revocation problem [27, 41]. People believe it is not
possible to get back the capabilities you gave out to somebody previously, as
they now have the complete control over those capabilities, and you cannot
destroy them on other users’ machines because of security reasons [28, 42].
With respect to the above comments, Miller and co-workers have managed
to give answers in their work [47, 48, 49]. Miller was trying to show that
these major problems of capability approach can be overcome using some
special mechanisms. First he stated that capabilities have more optimized
referencing structure than the traditional ACL approach. Table 2.2 shows
referencing relations between a group of users and a group of resources. It
used to be thought that the referencing structures of the two approaches
had little difference, as it is just the question of in which way to look at the
table: a vertical view for the ACL approach and a horizontal view for the
capability approach. But Miller argues if we take a deeper view of the actual
references between these two groups, the difference is clear (see Fig. 2.2).
In the ACL approach, references from both directions are needed: the users
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need to know where the resources are and the resources need to know who
can access them. But in the capability approach this has been simplified into
one direction: the capabilities themselves contain both references and the
access control information. This is believed by Miller to be an optimization.
Figure 2.2: Actual referencing relations
Secondly, for the confinement problem, Boebert emphasized the concept
of *-property [9]. Briefly speaking this property means that in a secure
system, information should flow only from the side of a lower security level
to the side of an equal or higher security level, but never the other way.
Boebert showed that an unmodified capability machine cannot gain this *-
property. Miller’s counter argument is illustrated by: assume Carol possesses
the resource and Alice has the capability to access them. Now Alice wants
to pass this capability to Bob. In order to do this, Alice must be herself
authorized to both Bob and Carol. So if Alice passes something to Bob,
it means that Alice and Bob have already built a trustworthy connection,
which has already gained the confinement. All the trustworthy connections
build up a safe environment for capabilities to be propagated, which Miller
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calls the Arena. To enter the arena, users must have agreed some terms of
entry for confinement. However, it can be argued that this is not a pure
unmodified capability approach.
Figure 2.3: Using Caretakers to Solve the Revocation Problem
Finally, Miller discussed the revocation problem. He stated that by in-
troducing a small modification, this problem can be solved (See Fig. 2.3 that
is shown in Miller’s Work [49]). To pass Carol’s capability to Bob, Alice
can modify the capability: it carries a caretaker, which will always check a
gate value before it can access Carol. This gate was set up by Alice, and it
is Alice’s business to switch this gate between enabled or disabled. When
disabled, the capability to Carol is ineffective. Again, people on the ACL
side argue that it is not a pure capability approach but using some ACL
techniques, while people on the capability side suggest that at least this is
an advantage over attaching access control information to resources.
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The debate of ACL vs. capability with respect to their advantages and
shortcomings could still continue for a long time.
2.3 Authentication
Authentication is a term with the meaning of confirming that something
is the entity it claims to be [52, 12]. In other words, it is the problem of
how to know that a subject (human, computer user, process, etc.) is itself.
Authentication is a general term in the field of security in computer science,
especially in the topic of networking. In traditional access control models, the
authentication processes happens just before the access control processes. In
the original pure capability approach, authentication is not such a big issue,
as the central unit needs only to check the validity and permission sets of
the capabilities themselves, but nothing about the agents who are presenting
the capabilities. However, considering the confinement problem and other
security problems, it is often necessary to modify capability based systems
to recognize the holders. Thus it is worth looking at the authentication issues
that may relate to capabilities.
There are some issues that show the need for authentication for capa-
bility systems. The confinement problem was introduced in the previous
paragraphs. It is never a good idea to give too much permission to untrusted
users, so before any propagation of capabilities, an authentication process
is required. In this case, the authentication processes should happen at the
users’ end, but depending on the implementation of the system, the ker-
nel may also join in this mechanism, e.g. some capability systems could be
implemented so all propagations of capabilities must be confirmed by the ker-
nel. Another situation in which the kernel needs to know the holders of the
capabilities is where systems need to implement garbage collection. Before
removing garbage resources the kernel must make sure there are no refer-
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ences to the garbage, but in classical capability approaches the kernel does
not have such knowledge. Therefore changes might be needed when kernels
need to know whether users possess references to some extent (although we
do not want the kernel to have full knowledge of users or processes, as this
may destroy the scalability of the capability approach).
One of the ideas involving authentication issues is to assign each possible
possessor an identity. This has been proposed in Li Gong’s work [28], and in
this paper the author suggested the mechanism of identity-based capability
system (ICAP), which added an identity value into each capability in the
system. The identity is created by the kernel or server when a new object
is created by a user, and it is a value generated by a one-way function. The
parameters of the function include the authentication information of the user
(maybe the user’s ID), the new object, issued permissions and an issuing
number that is generated and stored together with the new object. The key
difference of the ICAP from traditional capabilities is that any other user
with a different ID cannot use this capability to access the object, because
when accessing is being required the server will check the validity regarding
the user’s ID. In this way it enforces the control of the server over capabilities
and prevents the use of stolen capabilities. To legally propagate the ICAPs,
the original user will issue a message explaining that he agrees to pass the
capability to the receiving user. Then when the receiving user wants to use
this capability, he needs to present both the capability and the message to the
server, and the server will check the validity of the capability and message.
If all these tests are passed, the server will create a new capability for the
receiving user, by using his ID to assign the issuing number, and after this
the receiving user can use his own capability to access the object. In this
paper the author also proposed an enhanced version of ICAP introducing the
ancestor algorithm. The idea is that every time a capability is propagated,
the server will generate a new issuing number using the previous issuing
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number and the sending user’s ID. Therefore when a user wants to revoke any
capabilities that he passed out previously, he can simply inform the server
and the server can reject any capabilities of his descendants. The ICAP
system is claimed to be able to solve confinement and revocation problems
to a certain degree [28].
However, authentication is a much more complex question than this. It
is never guaranteed that only capabilities can be stolen. Assuming the user’s
ID has been leaked to the threatening agent, these protections could be
greatly weakened. Moreover, assuming that a threatening agent has got the
full information of a user, the agent can completely pretend to be the user.
There are no ways to discover this fake identity, unless the real user and the
threatening agent appear in the system at the same time. But the point is,
this is an uncommon situation. It is very difficult to steal all information
even from a low-level protected user device. On the other hand, this is a
situation beyond all protections. If the full information has been leaked to
another agent, no protection mechanisms can deal with this threat - not just
capability systems.
Another problem is, suppose a user carelessly lost his identification, how
can he prove to the server that he is the valid user but has lost the iden-
tifying information? How does an identity prove him to be himself? The
general problem of authentication is too big to discuss within the scope of
this work, and we assume procedures of authentication happens before proce-
dures of access control. Therefore, this work will not focus on authentication
problems.
2.4 Uses of Capabilities
Although there are always debates about capabilities, their advantages are
still attractive. Thus, since the invention of capabilities, this concept has been
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applied to many fields. The most straight forward application is following
the original ideas from Dennis and Van Horn [17] of operating systems. Ca-
pabilities are used as an alternative to access control lists to protect resources
in the system. Any users or processes that want to access data in the system
must provide valid capabilities in order to be granted access. Henry Levy
wrote a book in 1984 [45] in which he demonstrated many capability-based
computing systems, and discussed their histories and evaluations. These sys-
tems include some early examples, the Plessey System 250, the Cambridge
CAP, Hydra, StarOS, IBM System/38 and Intel iAPX 432. It is obvious that
some major research institutes and manufacturers gave attention to the idea
of capabilities. Kain and Landwehr [38] give a set of definitions of different
concepts in capability-based systems.
A more recent example was proposed by Shapiro and his colleagues. They
wrote several papers introducing a capability-based operating system called
EROS [59, 60, 61, 62]. In the evaluation part of the paper the authors
made a comparison between EROS and Linux over some major measurements
(pipe latency, pipe bandwidth, create process time, context switch time, heap
growth, page fault and trivial syscall). From the result of their experiments,
6 out of 7 measurements of EROS return a better performance than those of
Linux. Shapiro and colleagues believe that this proves that capability-based
systems can do as good as Linux, without any specialized hardware assists.
Another modern use of the capability concept is in memory management.
This relates to the compiling and running of programs. The researchers on
this topic use capabilities as a protection for memory regions against un-
matched type accesses. In region-based memory management the memory is
divided into regions and does not trace the structure of the heap, so it avoids
some complexity for garbage collection. Walker et al. [69] show a way of us-
ing capability protection to provide safe region operations, and Chargue´raud
and Pottier [13] extend this to include the idea of type preservation. The
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authors defined their variation of capabilities as a pair {α : θ}, where α rep-
resents a region in memory, while θ describes the type of the structure in
that region. The abstraction can be clearly seen here: it is no longer a set
of rights, but a type matching. Only if the capability represents the same
type or sub-type of the type in that region, can the access be validated. This
checking can be performed at both compile and run time.
A wider use of capabilities as a method of access control is in the field of
distributed environments and systems, and especially in open systems. Open
systems are systems where users or nodes may join and leave frequently,
i.e. they are opened to all users. This feature of the system means that
the population can be large and extremely unpredictable. This could be
a disaster for the traditional ACL approach of access control as it would
have to update and maintain a huge list again and again. The advantage of
the dynamic properties of the capability approach becomes obvious in these
systems, thus it is a great choice for distributed systems. Another reason that
might make distributed systems prefer capabilities is that, in a distributed
open system there might be many more users than resources, which addresses
the point that people used to treat as a weakness of capabilities when there
are more resources than users. In an open system, having everybody carry
a small set of capabilities seems to be better than letting the resources hold
huge lists of users, in both storage and load comparisons.
LINDA-like tuple space systems [8, 23, 24, 66, 67] are good models of
distributed open systems. It has been shown that to build a private channel in
open system could not be achieved in traditional ways. Alan Wood proposed
a mixed system combining ACL and capability techniques to deal with this
problem in 1999 [71]. A comparison between ACL and capability approaches
in LINDA-like systems is also contributed in this paper.
Recent work on the use of capabilities in distributed environments has
been reported by Gorla and Pugliese [29]. They proposed a language call
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µKLAIM, which is a modification to KLAIM. The original KLAIM also
adopted a tuple space approach, but it has the weakness of static access
control which cannot handle the dynamic changes during the programs ex-
ecuting while nodes join and leave. So the authors exploit capabilities to
overcome the weakness, and propose a combination of dynamic and static
approaches.
An interesting use of capabilities was explained in a paper in 2008 [57]. In
the paper the authors took capabilities into an Internet-based virtual envi-
ronment called Second Life.1 This is a kind of network program where users
can interact, communicate and trade in a shared environment. Participants
can use the provided tools to create their buildings and vehicles and so on.
Second Life uses the ACL approach to restrict the accesses. The authors
of the paper experimented with this kind of virtual environment using the
capability approach to replace ACLs. This work also uses caretakers to deal
with the revocation problem. One of the main points that was highlighted in
this work is the idea of facet, which is a pattern “to create capabilities that
only allow certain messages to be sent to the target object”. This starts to
bring the concept of behaviour into capabilities. It allows users to predefine
certain simple access patterns and reject any messages outside the facet def-
inition. However, this is still a simple model of behaviours, as it only defines
the type of accesses without any order or sequences.
Capabilities can also be used to integrate external uniqueness of object-
oriented systems. Haller and Odersky in their work [30] suggest adding some
semantics on the language of Scala [31] to ensure the uniqueness of the mes-
sages in distributed environment. This work also aim to “ensure race safety
with a type system that is simple and expressive enough to be deployed in
production systems by normal users”.
1http://www.secondlife.com
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2.5 Modifications of Capabilities
Recall the original structure of the capabilities that has been agreed for tens
of years: each capability consists of two parts of a reference to an identified
object and a set of rights (permissions). This is the standard representation
of capabilities. However, this is not a fixed definition. Capabilities can be
structured differently, and various workers have modified the representations
of capabilities to fit their own requirement.
ICAP [28], which has been mentioned in previous sections, is a good
example illustrating the modification of the structure of capabilities. In this
concept, there are three parts that constitute an ICAP capability: reference
to the object and the set of rights as usual, but a new identifying value which
is generated from the former two parts of the capability, the user’s identity
and a random value that is stored together with the object. This identity
feature is added to fulfill the aim of solving the confinement and revocation
problems.
Another example of the modification of capabilities is called split capa-
bilities [42]. In this work, capabilities are split into two parts: file locks and
keys (in original words, “ handle to the resource being accessed and a handle
to a separate resource representing the access rights being requested”). The
lock part is attached to the files. These locks are generated by the system,
and define the subjects able to unlock these locks. The lock part of the split
capabilities acts rather like an ACL feature, and it groups the subjects by
rights. The key part can be propagated by users, thus it follows the approach
of traditional capabilities. Every time a new access permission is assigned,
the system will generate the key with its value (ID), and add this value to
the lock part of the object that allows the access, and then distribute this
key to the user who is allowed to perform this accessing action. Now the
user is free to pass this key, or new keys generated from it, to other users.
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When a user requests the system to access a certain file, he should show his
key. The system then checks the value of the key to see if it is on the lock
part of the file, without knowing which user is doing this request and how he
got the key. If the value is correct, the system unlocks the protection for the
file and the access is granted. An interesting feature of split capabilities is
that each key also has an access action and that is the ‘Destroy’ operation.
It performs also as a lock, and can be unlocked by other keys. The split
capability approach is claimed to be able to achieve the *-property [9] and
solve the revocation problem. However, the disadvantage of this approach
is that there is still information attached to the objects, thus it decreases
the flexibility to some degree. But it still an improvement over ACLs as the
locks do not list all users, but only keys which could be much fewer than the
number of users, compared to the traditional ACL approach.
Multicapabilities [65] modifies the capability structure in another way.
This work proposed by Udzir is based on LINDA systems [8, 23, 24, 66,
67]. LINDA systems are distributed systems that adopt tuple space ideas.
In tuple spaces there are tuples which are unnamed entries, and users or
processes input and output tuples by using templates. It is clear that the
traditional capability approach cannot be directly applied to LINDA systems,
as the unnamed tuples cannot be referred by capabilities. Udzir solves this by
introducing the idea of multicapabilities, which instead of referring to a single
named object, they can match a number of tuples in the same template. The
structure of multicapabilities is given by a triple {u t p}, where p is the set of
permissions, t stands for the template and u is a unique tag to identify this
group of tuples (compare to the structure of traditional capabilities: a pair
{o p}, as o for object reference and p for set of permissions). The work of
multicapabilities moves towards introducing the class concept to capabilities,
and the contributions of this work have applications in the fields of garbage
collection, deadlock breaking, private channels and replication and caching.
30 Chapter 2. Background
2.6 Limitations of Capabilities
As has been mentioned repeatedly, the main use of capabilities is access con-
trol which can be applied in different environments, in either centralized or
decentralized systems. They can also protect resources or memory regions
and filter valid or invalid accesses over different permissions. However, the
potential of the capability approach is greater than just access control. We
would like a more powerful dynamic control for accesses and other actions,
and maybe some of these requirements cannot be expressed using the tra-
ditional capability concept due to the simple structure. That is, there are
some limitations to capabilities.
The confinement and revocation problems have been discussed earlier:
they are the well known limitations. Now let us look at something more.
Traditional capabilities use the notion of permission sets. There is a naive
premise: these permissions have been assigned permanently, and users can
use their capabilities to access objects at any time and any number of times,
if the capabilities are valid. This is good enough where it meets require-
ments of systems. However, people often do not do things like this, as we
have different situations and conditions, and we do different behaviour at
different times. Take an example: assume one has just opened a new bank
account, so in the capability view, he now should have the rights to deposit
and withdraw money to and from the account. But in fact it is not allowed
to withdraw anything until one has saved a certain amount into his new ac-
count. Apparently, in this case it is a matter of sequence of actions, and the
objects usually have their states. In different states there are different possi-
ble actions. These sequences of actions cannot be represented by traditional
capabilities. In order to make capabilities able to handle these behaviours,
an upgrade is necessary, and this is exactly the topic this work is looking at.
We will explore this in following chapters.
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2.7 Session Types
Session Types [33, 43, 54, 58] provide mechanism that “allows the specifica-
tion of a protocol to be expressed as a type” [58]. In many communications
between two parties, the interaction is likely to last for some time, and hence
they should be treated differently from a ‘one-time only’ style of communi-
cation (e.g. call-return, pass-away, etc.). The session type theory can de-
fine communications with a prescribed conversation plan, which specifies the
types of individual messages and the allowable sequences of messages. When
a communication with session types is established, the communicating par-
ties will have expectations of the following message exchanging pattern and
the type of values being sent and received. With session types, it is ensured
that the two parties are communicating with the same and correct protocol;
that the sent messages or values are received by the opposite party; that the
types of messages and the communication patterns are agreed in advance;
that branching and looping flow control are correctly implemented by both
parties [54].
The session type theory provides an approach that describes the types
and sequences (including branching and looping) of messages in interactions.
This is similar to the concept we defined as behaviours, so it is worth cou-
pling with this project. However, the session type theory has a different
orientation from the research that is presented in this thesis. Firstly, the
session types define types and sequences on communications between two
parties, while the behaviour access control evolved from the capability ap-
proach concerns data being accessed by multiple entities, who may share
common behaviour patterns and propagate access permissions. Secondly,
session types are mainly used for verifying the correct implementation and
use of communication protocols at compile-time, while the capability-like
approaches are more practical components that have their effectiveness at
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run-time.
2.8 Summary
Capabilities, being an approach to access control, has been introduced in this
chapter. Compared with the traditional access control approach of ACLs,
capabilities show less dependence on kernels and central controls. In such
systems, capabilities are components that contain access control informa-
tion, and provide it to kernels when necessary. They are held by users and
processes, which means there is less load on kernels. Moreover, the holders
of capabilities can pass them to other entities in the system, such that the
permissions for accessing objects can be propagated instantly when they are
required, and do not need to inform kernels (or less information is needed to
notify kernels). These makes capabilities a better choice of access control ap-
proaches in parallel and distributed systems. Capabilities have a number of
advantages over ACLs, and good properties of dynamic access control, thus
the idea of capabilities has been applied to various areas such as operating
systems, building private communication channels, etc.
However, capabilities also have some drawbacks that need to be solved,
such as the confinement problem and the revocation problem. Researchers
have been working on this and have proposed a number of solutions, most
of them involving changing the structure of capabilities. There are also lim-
itations on capabilities in that they only provide simple permission controls,
and are not precise enough in controlling sequences of actions, or behaviours.
This motivates us to develop better solutions that have finer behaviour con-
trol functionalities.
We will see a progressed development of access control approach that is
extended from capabilities in the next chapter called Vistas, which show the
direction of evolving towards the behaviour controlling.
Chapter 3
Vistas
The Capability concept for access control is quite abstract, as components
in such systems are defined implicitly. It just describes a mechanism in
principle: agents carry some sets of permissions and each set of permissions
refers to a target. There are many gaps in this which have not been finalised
and have been left for developers to adjust to get a specified capability-based
system that best fits. These spaces include: how do the set of permissions
and the reference to the target group to form a capability; how do references
in capabilities link to targets; what are targets, etc. It is because of these
parameters that the modifications of capabilities becomes feasible.
Taking the advantage of capabilities in dynamic control, we would like to
keep extending this idea to make it more applicable in distributed environ-
ments. Since capabilities have been proposed as an access control approach,
they are used for protecting objects from invalid operations. However, as
more sophisticated applications are developed, these objects become more
and more complex. An object may contain a set of data, many references
to other objects, field variables that indicate the current state of the object,
large data blocks, and so on. It can be far beyond a simple file that only
needs permissions to read and write. Hence it is worth expanding the simple
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idea of capabilities to catch such complexity of objects, and Vistas are such
a development.
Vistas focus on the relationship between references in capabilities and
components in objects, and are a step towards better behaviour modelling
and control.
3.1 Vista Ideas
It has been mentioned that an object may have many field variables, each
representing some particular information that may or may not be accessed
by agents or users. Then to the access control view, the accesses to different
field variables shall be treated individually. Thus we define a visibility to be
a pair consisting of: a) an object reference, and b) one of its variables, or
names (or a sequence of names, see the operation of product in the following
section). The object reference can be held by several users, and having this
visibility means a user can access to the variable or name that is referred.
If we take a relational view [73, 74] of visibilities, then clearly it means
that a name in an object is mapped from one object reference by the ‘relation’
of visibilities, and a collection of visibilities becomes a relation from the set
(domain) of object references held by users to the set (codomain) of names (or
name chains) in targeted objects. We call this collection a vista. Vistas are
first-class reified runtime objects that are used for access control. Users hold
vistas to claim their rights to access those targeted objects. Since visibilities
in vistas are not ordered, and the number of appearances of a visibility has no
influence on the permissions granted by the vista, it can be seen that vistas
are sets of visibilities. This set view of Vistas could be useful, as it means
that we can apply properties and operations in set theory [36, 1] to our Vista
concepts. This is particularly important when we come to the topic of Vista
Combinator Operations.
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Figure 3.1: An Illustration of How Vistas Refer to Objects
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It should be noted that a vista may contain visibilities to multiple objects,
which means that with one vista the holder is able to operate on many
objects if he wants. Another notable thing is that one vista does not need
to contain visibilities for all names for a targeted object. This means the
case is possible that the holder of a vista can only access part of its targeted
object. These properties make vistas more precise when controlling accesses
for those complex objects, compared with capabilities. For example, imagine
there is an object having the profile of a student in a university, and there are
methods that can view and change the content or status of different parts in
this profile. The university has the vista that contains all visibilities to every
part of this object of profile, which means the administration of the university
can freely access, view and change the profile. The student himself can be
given a vista which only has permissions to methods of ‘apply for a course’.
There can also be a vista that open to the public, and with it the holder can
view some data of the student such as name, gender and the programme he
is taking.
Vistas are collections, and so there is no difference between a user hav-
ing one vista containing all visibilities he is holding, or having many vistas
grouped by partitions of the set of all visibilities — the permissions for ac-
cesses are the same. However, it is still possible for a user to have multiple
vistas at some point of time. This will be illustrated in the following sections.
3.2 Vista Combinator Operations
As defined, vistas are first-class objects, and they can be operated on in the
same way as other objects, in object-oriented systems. Assuming there is a
vista α and an action read, then we can use α.read to express a read action
using the vista α. However, according to the property of vistas described in
the previous section, a vista might contain references to multiple targeted
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objects, and it is possible that more than one object is permitted to be read
by this vista. This would not be a fault though, as it allows the possibility of
executing one command on multiple targets. This introduces an interesting
feature of forcing the users to execute actions to multiple targets at the same
time. For instance, imagine there is a user u1 writing an article, and for
some reason he cannot finish it. Thus he would like to let another user u2 to
continue writing the article instead of him, but he still want to keep a private
copy of the article such that he can read it when u2 append new contents
into the article. With the multiple targets of vistas we can realize this by: u1
make a copy a2 from the original article a1 and save it privately, and giving
a1 and a vista v containing both visibilities of the write permission to a1
and the write permission to a2 to u2. When u2 performs a write action
using v, it will simultaneously update both a1 and a2. Fig. 3.2 illutrates how
this process happens. Note that we do not want u2 to prevent a2 from being
written simultaneously, because this is exactly what u1 wants to ensure that
u2 behaves correctly. To achieve this the system/language implementing this
vista approach must be able to handle multiple selection.
There are a number of ways to obtain a vista. As vistas are extensions of
capability ideas, the methods used to obtain capabilities are also inherented
by vista systems [72].
- Initiality. Some vistas will be available to an entity (agent or user) on
its creation or when joining the system. These vistas are likely to cover the
access visibilities for the new entity itself (so that other entities can use these
visibilities to access this new one).
- Parenthood. Vistas for a newly created object are available to the creator
of this object. It is assumed that this vista contains visibilities to all names
in the object.
- Endowment. The creator of new objects can pass any vistas he holds
to these new objects. In object-oriented systems this corresponds to passing
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Figure 3.2: Process of Applying Multiple Targets Aspect
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vistas as arguments to the constructor of the new object.
- Introduction. An entity can pass vistas to another by sending messages
containing vistas, either by actively giving out or passively replying to re-
quests from other entities. In non-distributed object-oriented systems this
process corresponds to parameters and returned results for methods. In dis-
tributed systems this can be realized by physical conmmunication between
two entities.
Other than these, there is a new path to obtain vistas:
- Combination. An entity can use vistas he is holding to produce new
vistas, using some operations. Entities can use these operations to adjust
permissions as required and send the new vista to other entities.
Before any operations can be introduced, there are two fundamental re-
quirements that must be kept.
Requirement 1 Visibilities cannot be increased.
Requirement 2 Vistas cannot be forged.
The first requirement implies that however the vista operation is designed,
the resulting vista must not contain visibilities that do not exist in the vistas
the creator is holding. Not satisfying this requirement means entities can
gain more access than already assigned to them. The second requirement
ensures that entities cannot obtain vistas by ways other than the proposed
ones. Again this protects systems from illegitimate accesses.
Table 3.1 shows a general view of the four basic vista operations that
could be useful for entities to combine and create new vistas. And more
detailed explanation is given below:
Sum is the very operation that makes a vista refer to multiple objects.
Taking the set view of vistas, the result of a sum operation is a set
of visibilities, which is the union of the two original vistas i.e. sets of
visibilities. As for the requirements, the summed vista is the largest set
of any sets that result from any binary vista operation, as it contains
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Sum α + β is a vista representing all the visibilities of α
and β.
Difference α−N ,
α− β
is a vista containing the visibilities of α with-
out those, if any, referring to the names con-
tained in the set N , or in the vista β. Since
a vista can be regarded as a set of visibilities,
this operation is naturally overloaded to allow
a vista as its second argument.
Intersection α ∧ β,
α ∧N
is the vista containing visibilities, if any, that
are common to α and β. This is extended to
work with a set of names N as in the case of
difference.
Product α× β is a vista that represents ordered pairs of vis-
ibilities from α and β.
Table 3.1: Four Basic Vista Operations
all visibilities from the two original vistas. Vistas combined from other
operations can only be a subset of the result of a sum.
Difference works like the difference operation in set theory. The result
of α − β will have all visibilities of α without those in β. The vista
operation of difference can use a set of names as the second operand, in
which case the result will not contain any visibilities refereing to names
in the given set.
Intersection between two vistas acts as the intersection of these two sets
of visibilities. In the intersected vista there are only visibilities that
appear in both of the original vistas. Again intersection can also have
a set of names as its second operand, in which case the resulting vista
will contain visibilities referring to names in this set only.
Product performs differently from the other three operations, and it gives
a taste of behaviour modelling. A product between two vistas means
‘the holder must perform actions in the two vistas consecutively’, and
Chapter 3. Vistas 41
this consecutive execution shall not be intercepted by other actions. In
the resulting vista of a product between α and β, there are no longer
simple visibilities, but a collection of pairs/strings of visibilities. The
first part of visibilities represented in these pairs is from α and the
second part of visibilities is from β. These pairs/strings become tied
actions that will be executed in order atomically. In an object oriented
view, to use a product vista α, some command like α.<f,g >will be
called. There are cases when the first action in this pair may not be
executed properly, which could be caused either by the user not having
the permission to perform this action, or errors or exceptions happening
while the action is processing. In the former case it is suggested to deny
the second action in the action pair as well, but in the latter case it
may be acceptable to let the second action being normally performed
if it will not be affected by the error of the first action.
In vistas, although one can keep using the product produce strings/chains
of actions to have a ‘taste’ of behaviours, they are still very simple. These are
only sequences, and as they are performed atomically, once the tied actions
started, it cannot be interrupted and turn to other actions. The aspect
of behaviour should include branches that would let the actor to choose
actions. Controlling behaviours will be examined later in the context of
Treaties (Chapter 4).
3.3 Use-Cases
Due to the difference between vistas and capabilities, there are some new
ways of applying vistas in practice. In this section some examples of novel
use-cases which use vistas are introduced.
Instant Messaging
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Consider a simple chat system with users distributed across the network.
Users are allowed to communicate peer-to-peer, and they are also able to
create chat rooms divided by topics, and these rooms allow multiple users to
‘broadcast’ their messages to all other users in the same room at the same
time. In a capability-like system, to send a message to another user you will
need to obtain write access to him. To send one message to multiple targets,
copies of the message will be sent one by one.1 In a vista-based system, we
can realize this function by using the operation of sum (shown in Fig. 3.3).
To initialize, an entity sends the vista including his write visibility to the
manager of the chat room (either the creator of the room or the server), and
the manager sends this vista to members of the room, then these members
return acknowledge with their vistas for write. Each member now uses the
sum operation to combine their newly obtained vista with their room vista
topic. To broadcast a message, members can execute topic.write(message),
and the message will be spread to all members in the chat room. At the
implementation level, how the system will actually do this action depends
on the facilities of the language. If the language supports concurrency or
multicast functionality, then it can broadcast the message to all members.
To terminate, the member can do a topic.leave action which informs
other members of his leaving, and then the other members can use a difference
operation to remove the exiting member’s write visibility.
Security Proxy
Imagine a new student, Alice, is enrolled by a university. She will need to
set up an account so that her tuition fees can be saved and collected; the fees
are provided by her parents. But rather than a simple account, the parents
would like to add some control on it so that the account is guaranteed to be
1Actually there is another way of dealing with this, and it is to create a new object that
represents the chat room, and let each member in the room have both read and write
permission to this room object, but this requires extra resources supplied by the system.
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Figure 3.3: Difference Between Using a Set of Vistas and a Summed Vista
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used for tuition fees only. The specified requirements are: Alice can view the
balance of the account and deposit money in it (in case she may do some
part-time jobs), and the University can withdraw money from it and also
deposit into it (rewards or new sponsorship), while the deposit permission
is open to the public (for donations). The parents have full permissions
including save, withdraw and (view) balance.
Assume the full vista is called account. A simple way of achieving the
requirements would be to create the vista (account∧{save,balance}). How-
ever, due to the properties of vistas, these visibilities could be propagated
and other entities may access to the balance of the account. Thus as well as
the account object, the bank provides an extra security object called guard.
This object can examine the identity information of entities by a login ac-
tion with the entities’ details. Now an enhanced version of Alice’s vista can
be produced by using product operation:
alice = (guard.login(aliceDetails)× account.balance) + account.save
Using this vista, anyone who wants to view the balance will have to
provide Alice’s details, so a stronger security is provided. And because the
save permission is not restricted by guard, Alice can distribute the vista to
others for any donation and presents.
Similarly, the financial office of the university will be offered a vista like:
fees = guard.login(uniDetails)× (account ∧ {withdraw,save})
which means the university will need to provide relevant information be-
fore access to the tuition account, but viewing balance is not available to the
university. Vistas held by different roles in this case are shown in Fig. 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Users Holding Different Vistas Access to a Same Object
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter the idea of Vistas has been introduced which has been fur-
ther described in the previous published paper [72]. Vistas are access control
components that extend the capability approach a further step. In the Vista
approach access control is made finer by specifying accesses to the field val-
ues and methods (in object-oriented sense) in each target object, and these
explicit accesses are represented by visibilities. Each visibility is a pair con-
sisting of a reference to the target object and the identifier of one of the field
values or methods in this object. The holder of a visibility can view and
modify the field value or call the method in the referred object. Vistas are
sets of any visibilities one holds, hence a vista can grant accesses to multiple
objects.
Vistas can be constructed using vista operations, by regrouping visibil-
ities inside. With the constructed vistas, users can define different access
patterns. This enhances the services such that the holder of the vista can
access different sets of target objects, or he can pass the vista to other users
with the access pattern specified by him.
The product operation in vistas realizes sequences of accesses, and this
shows a particularly interesting development: controlling the accesses in a
behavioural way. In the real world many behaviours exist, made by humans,
machines and many other active objects. These behaviours usually include a
number of actions happening in particular orders and patterns. For example,
the behaviour of someone going home after work: he will unlock the door
first, then walk into the house, lock the door from inside, then either take off
his coat then shoes, or take off his shoes first then coat. The behaviour stops
here, followed by other behaviours such as cooking and taking a shower. It
would be nice if we could take control over accesses step by step so that we
can force the actions taken by entities to become meaningful behaviours.
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Vistas formed by product operations can make sequences of actions that
show an aspect of behaviours, but they are still not able to simulate the
‘choices’, or branches, of actions. They cannot allow and then stop accesses
to variables in objects, as vistas also grant unlimited number of accesses like
capabilities. It is necessary to look for a new approach of making behaviour
control to make development progress.
The following chapters will introduce an extension to vistas which allow
a more complete control over behaviours.
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Chapter 4
Treaty Concepts
Treaties extend the capability and vista ideas to a new level. Capabilities
and vistas only deal with rights. These rights in capabilities are indepen-
dent, unlimited and unordered. For example, assuming there is a capability
containing both read and write rights, the two access rights are not depen-
dent on each other, and the holder of the capability can do read or write
an unlimited number of times, and in any order. This is a straight-forward
mechanism that is suitable for simple systems. However, as services become
more sophisticated, the simple mechanism is no longer satisfactory for com-
plex system requirements. There are many cases that require the access
actions to be in certain orders, or a limited number of times. We call these
sequences of actions behaviours. Clearly capabilities are unable to specify
behaviours, except in the most trivial sense. Vistas make one step towards
behavioural control, by the product operation, but they are still too simple:
there is only sequencing of actions. Hence we need to find new ways to fit the
behavioural specifications, such as sequences, choices and limited repetitions
of actions. We will introduce the solution in this chapter.
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4.1 What Treaties Are
Recall our motivation of progressing from action control to behaviour con-
trol: the simple capabilities can only do the former control. In capabilities,
there are only sets of action types that allow the holder of the capability to
perform actions of types defined in the set to the referred object. The valid
actions granted by the capability are independent, unlimited and unordered,
which means, performing an action will not be affected by the performing
of other actions, these actions in the action set can be performed as many
times as users like, and the performance of these actions has no particular
sequence. These properties cannot completely define behaviours, which are
characterised by sequences, branches and terminations. Capabilities have
such a simple structure that they are not capable of controlling behaviours,
therefore we intend to upgrade them to solve this problem, and we call our
solution Treaties.
Treaties evolved from the idea of capabilities and vistas, and so they can
also be used as access control components. This inheritance implies that
treaties adopt many properties from capabilities:
 They are structures that define the rights to operating on resources.
 They are not centrally controlled, but are held by user-level agents.
 In treaty systems a user must present an appropriate treaty to the
kernel (middleware) in order to perform actions on the resource that
he is accessing.
 Only kernels can create the initial treaty to a certain resource - users
cannot forge any treaties.
 Treaties shall also inherit the aspect of dynamic access control of ca-
pabilities, as they can be propagated throughout systems.
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The aspect of dynamic access control is characterised by the fact that: a
user who possesses a treaty can pass it to another user, and the receiver of
the treaty then gains the same rights to access the object it refers to. In this
way the permissions can be distributed without notifying the kernels, as in
the case of capabilities. This means that treaties are suitable to be deployed
in distributed environments as well.
The key function that treaties provide is ‘behaviour control’. This differs
from the ‘rights-only’ mode of capabilities in the sense that a treaty can allow
or deny different actions at different times or stages, depending on the current
state of the treaty or current stage of the process/behaviour (capabilities are
stateless entities, and so cannot control sequences of actions. See Fig. 4.1).
With treaties, sequences of allowed actions are specified and enforced, in
order to form behaviours.
Figure 4.1: Structure of Capabilities and Treaties
As an example of a behaviour as a sequence of actions from everyday-
life, in the morning we sign-in to our email services, read new emails, reply
to senders and finally shut-down mail boxes. This is exactly a simple but
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typical behaviour. At the beginning, one cannot read or compose mails but
only log in. After logging in one can read and compose an unlimited number
of times, until logging out, after which only logging in is allowed. Treaties
aim to capture these attributes of behaviours, such as sequencing, branching
and terminating.
States are a vital part of the Treaty concept. A behaviour can have
multiple states, and these states are connected by actions/accesses. Every
time a user performs a valid action over a resource, a transition between the
current state and the target state is made (keep in mind that these are not
necessarily two distinct states). The current state is a pointer or indicator
to one of states in the behaviour contained in a treaty. This is similar to
finite-state machines [11, 14, 15], and in fact an FSM is a good option for
representing behaviours [76].
Abstractly, treaties are access control components that provide specifica-
tions of behaviours that can be followed for a number of resources, together
with the current state of the evolution of the behaviours. As fundamental
requirements, treaties shall:
 refer to resources.
 provide information to a kernel to enable it to allow or deny an action
request.
 not be strictly bound to agents, i.e. kernels do not need to check their
holders’ identities in order to grant or deny actions.
 be able to ‘evolve’ behaviours according to their specifications, i.e. main-
tain and update the current state.
Therefore each treaty can be seen as consisting of three components: the
reference pointing to the resource (or resources), the behaviour descriptor
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modelling the behaviours permitted by the treaty, and the current state of
the behaviour in this treaty. From this, we can see that that capabilities are
a special type of treaty, in which there is only a single behavioural state, and
all allowed actions are reflexive transitions on this state.
In a treaty-based system, the usual process of using treaties can be as
follows:
1. a user U requires the kernel to create a resource R;
2. the kernel creates the resource R and returns a treaty T to user U ,
where T contains all possible action types regarding to the resource R
with unlimited number of accessing repetitions;
3. user U can refine the behaviour model represented by the behaviour
descriptor in T so that specific treaties T1...Tn are constructed;
4. U can pass these treaties (both newly refined and that have been exe-
cuted) to other users U1...Un to distribute the right to access R;
5. Um who received Tm can show this treaty to the kernel to access R, if
this action is validated by Tm.
4.1.1 Terms and Definitions in Treaty Systems
Before any formal definitions can be given, we will need to understand the
following terms that will be or have been used, to avoid any confusion.
Kernel - Also referred to as server. This is the unit that processes requests
from users. In traditional approaches kernels act as the role of admin-
istration, and in the capability and treaty approach kernels still do the
important job of checking validity and addressing objects.
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Subject - The holder of treaties, including users and processes, depending
on different types of systems. Subjects can exchange treaties among
themselves, and will show treaties to kernels when they need to access
objects.
Object - Can also be called resources or files. Objects are the part that
is protected by treaties. Note that in distributed systems, objects are
usually not located centrally, but on devices of different subjects. And
in some cases, subjects themselves can be objects, where ‘send message’
is the possible accessing action, and need to be protected by a treaty.
Subjects and Objects are both entities in systems.
Action - This is the term used to call a single access. For example, in a file
system, read and write can be two types of actions. The following —
to read from a file, then append (write) some information to the file,
and finally read the file again — is regarded as three actions.
Behaviour - We define a behaviour as a sequence of actions. Each behaviour
contains an ordered list of actions. The mentioned ‘read-write-read’
example is a behaviour. The number of actions in a behaviour can be
any non-negative integer, including zero (empty behaviour) and infinity
(might be a loop of actions).
Behaviour Model - Sometimes we need to describe behaviours instead of
listing them one by one. A behaviour model defines a group of be-
haviours using sequencing, branching and terminating. One behaviour
model contains multiple behaviours, and we can say these behaviours
are modelled by the behaviour model.
Behaviour Descriptor - This term is used with regards to implementa-
tions, and behaviour descriptors are a component of treaties. A be-
haviour descriptor represents one behaviour model (or more than one,
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depending on the choice of referencing style which will be discussed
later).
Current State - This is used to indicate the current point in a behaviour
model. Each time a valid action is performed, it will cause a move or
transition from the current state (may move back to the same state).
Again the current states are a component of treaties.
Example of the structure of a treaty system is shown in Fig. 4.2. In
this simple case there are three users: user1, user2, user3, which are in the
classification of subjects. There are also three objects of resource1, resource2,
resource3, and users possess treaties that contain permissions to some of
the objects. Two kernels exist in this system and each of them directly
communicates with some entities (either subject or objects). If user3 want
to access resource2 (assuming he has the correct permission), he will first
report to kernel2 and hand in the treaty:R2, and kernel2 will communicate
with kernel1. Kernel1 then checks the premissions in treaty:R2, and grant
the action requested by user3.
Treaties and their representing behaviours can be also seen as regular
languages [20, 75]. All action types for the resource can be seen as the
alphabet of the language, and the behaviours are strings in the language (we
will use [α ]to represent the behaviour set given by the treaty α). Taking
an example, suppose there is a treaty α which allows its holder to do only
three actions ‘read-write-read’ to the resource consecutively, then the valid
behaviour set [α ]granted by α, i.e. the valid string set in this language is:
{, read, read.write, read.write.read}.  is the empty behaviour that
means doing nothing, and it will exist in any behaviour set defined by any
behaviour model.
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Figure 4.2: An example of the Structure of a Treaty-based System
We define a behaviour model M on an object as
M = (Q,Σ, t, q)
where Q stands for the set of all states in this model; Σ is the set of all
action types for the type of the targeted object; t represents the set of all
action transitions between pairs of states in (a subset of) Q ; q the current
state of this behaviour model. If we take a look at the definition of finite-
state machines [15] we find that in our definition of behaviour model, there
is no set of accepting states F. This is because our behaviour model is used
for access control, and in access control systems the actions are dealt with
individually. Every time a subject asks the kernel for a single action, the
kernel will return the validation result of it, and no future actions concerned,
which means it does not consider whether there will be a next action and
what it is — the validation process is only based on the current state of
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the behaviour. The subject can stop performing actions at any state in the
behaviour model and this is perfectly valid. Thus, any state in behaviour
models could be seen as an accepting state, i.e. F = Q.
4.2 Operations and the Rule of Treaties
As has already been mentioned, when a new resource object is created, the
kernel provides the creator of this object a ‘complete’ treaty, which con-
tains all possible action types with unlimited repetitions, i.e. a capability.
To transform the complete treaty into a treaty that specifies more refined
behaviours, we need a number of combinator operations. However, there is
a fundamental rule for these treaty combinator operations. To keep the in-
tegrity of treaty systems, we must ensure the action permissions held by a
user would never exceed the scope of permissions that have been assigned to
him.
Rule. An agent cannot increase the totality of behaviours defined by the
treaties it holds.
This is the core requirement of treaty operations, all operations and their
results must obey this rule, in any representation and implementation of
treaty systems.
4.2.1 The Five Basic Operations
Corresponding to attributes of behaviours of sequencing, branching and ter-
minating, there are three basic operations: concatenate, join and restrict.
In addition, two operations of intersect and difference are also introduced
below:
Restrict is a unary operation that can decrease the number of times a
certain type of action can be executed to an assigned number. The
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actual way of designing this operation can be varied depending on dif-
ferent representations of treaty systems. For a treaty α, restrict will
be shown: [α]an, where a is the type of action to be restricted, and n is
the maximum number of times that a can be performed.
Difference (−) operates between two treaties, or a treaty and action type.
For two treaties α and β, α− β contains behaviours in α that are not
in β. α− a removes all a actions from α.
Concatenate (·) is a binary operation which connects behaviours in two
treaties in order. α · β is a treaty that allows all behaviours consisting
of a behaviour allowed by α followed by a behaviour allowed by β.
Intersect (u) is a binary operation which results in a treaty whose be-
haviour is the intersection of the behaviours of the two original treaties.
Treaty α u β specifies behaviours that are allowed by both α and β.
Join (unionsq) is also a binary operation which constructs a treaty from two
original treaties, so that the holder can choose to perform a behaviour
from either of the original treaties. Treaty α unionsq β allows all behaviours
in α and β.
To help understanding, Fig. 4.3 demonstrates how the four binary oper-
ations perform. Assuming there are two behaviour models in two treaties,
in each figure the left circle denotes the starting state of the result, and the
right circle denotes the finishing state. The path between the two states is
the valid behaviour model that results from the two original ones. In the
case of intersect operation the path is the region with slashed lines, and for
the difference operation the path is the shadowed region.
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Figure 4.3: Graphical Illustration of Binary Treaty Operations
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4.2.2 Using Behaviour Sets to Prove Correctness of
Operations
In order to make sure these operations do not break the rule, it is necessary
to know the upper bound of the behaviour set that the holder of the original
treaties can do. Assume one has two independent treaties α and β. Let
treaty α contain only two consecutive actions read;write, and treaty β
contain two consecutive actions execute;rename. As these actions in two
treaties are independent, the sequences of performing actions can be in any
order, and all sequences are given by:
read;write;execute;rename
read;execute;write;rename
read;execute;rename;write
execute;read;write;rename
execute;read;rename;write
execute;rename;read;write
From this observation we find that the upper bound of the behaviour
set by two independent treaties is a shuﬄe [26, 37, 6] of the two original
behaviour sets.1 Generally speaking, the shuﬄe operation produces a set of
expressions from two expressions such that in the resulting expression every
letter will follow its sequence in the original expression, but the order of
letters from two different expressions are completely independent.
There is, however, another point that needs to be noticed. The be-
havioural accesses allow users to perform actions in some order as the be-
haviour model defines, but it does not mean that to complete a behaviour
one must perform all actions until the model reaches a terminating state
(in fact many models do not have such states). In treaty-based access con-
trol systems, all users need to do is to ask the kernel whether they can do
1Here it is assumed each action is separated, and there is no notion of atomicity in
treaties in the abstract treaty concept.
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an action before it is performed, and users can stop performing actions at
any point in behaviour models, regardless of the following actions. In other
words, every state in behaviour models is an ‘accepting’ state. From this,
we have found a property of behaviour sets defined by behaviour models:
these sets are prefix closed [53], which means that if a sequence of actions
(behaviour) is in a behaviour set, then its prefix is also in this set:
let an action a ∈ Σ
let a behaviour B ∈ Σ∗
for a behaviour set S, if B.a ∈ S, then B ∈ S
Let us define a shuﬄe operation between two treaties that will produce a
prefix-closed shuﬄed behaviour set from the two treaties, using the symbol
. Let α and β be the two original treaties, u(α) be any unary operation
over α and } be any binary treaty combinator operator, we can rewrite the
fundamental rule formally as the following:
[u(α) ]⊆ [α ]
[α} β ]⊆ [α β ]
Consequently, it must be shown that the treaty operations conform to
this rule.2 Note that shuﬄe is a commutative operator, i.e. α β = β  α.
Restrict From the definition of restrict it is clear that restrict operation
will only decrease behaviours from the original treaty, thus it certainly
obeys the rule.
[[α]an ]⊆ [α ]
Concatenate Because the shuﬄe operation allows actions from different
sets of behaviours to be performed in arbitrary order, it is perfectly
valid to let actions from the first treaty to be performed before the
2For now, let us assume treaties that are applied by operations should refer to the same
target object.
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second treaty, which is exactly what the concatenate operation does.
Hence:
[α · β ]⊆ [α β ]
Join and Intersect Since the behaviour sets are prefix closed, we have
[α ]⊆ [α · β ],
as behaviours in α are prefixes of behaviours in α · β. Since ‘⊆’ is
transitive, we have
[α ]⊆ [α β ],
and similarly
[β ]⊆ [α β ].
By the definition of the join and intersect operations
[α unionsq β ]= [α ]∪ [β ],
[α u β ]= [α ]∩ [β ].
Due to the set theory, [α ]∪ [β ]⊆ [α  β ], [α ]∩ [β ]⊆ [α  β ].
Thus
[α unionsq β ]⊆ [α β ],
[α u β ]⊆ [α β ].
Difference For the difference operation, taking a naive view, we might
think that [α − β ]= [α ]\ [β ](set minus). However, assuming there
are two treaties γ and δ referring to a same target, γ allows a read
action then a write while δ allows only a read.
[γ ]= { , read, read.write }
[δ ]= { , read }
Thus
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[γ ]\ [δ ]= { , read.write }
This set is not a prefix closed set, so it does not conform the prop-
erty of behaviour sets. This illustrates that the operation of difference
cannot simply be defined to be a set difference between two treaties.
All behaviours that have prefixes in the behaviour set defined by the
second operand treaty must also be taken from the behaviour set from
the first operand treaty. This is also naturally reasonable, as if one is
banned from doing something, one will certainly not be allowed to do
anything that must be preceded by the banned behaviour.
Thus, the difference operation α − β is defined by removing all non-
empty behaviours in [β ]and the behaviours that have these β-behaviours
as prefixes from [α ]:
[α− β ]= [α ]\ { x | x = b.Σ∗, where b ∈ [β ]and b 6= }
And since it is a set minus from α, and [α ]⊆ [α β ], we can get
[α− β ]⊆ [α β ]
Therefore we have shown all the five basic operations obeys the rule of
treaties, and hence they are safe to be used for behaviour model refinement.
We provide the formal definition for the five operations in Table 4.1 using
the concept of behaviour sets. a@b denotes the number of times that action
a appears in behaviour b.
4.2.3 Laws of Treaty Operations
Basic treaty operations have been conceptually defined, and by their defi-
nitions we can find a number of algebraic laws that are followed by these
operations. Assume there are three treaties α, β and γ, and we define an
empty treaty which allows its holder to do nothing as φ, then
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join α unionsq β [α unionsq β ] = [α ] ∪ [β ]
intersect α u β [α u β ] = [α ] ∩ [β ]
difference α− β [α− β ] = [α ] \ { x | x = b.Σ∗, b ∈ [β ], b 6= }
concatenate α · β [α · β ] = { x | x = b1.b2, b1 ∈ [α ], b2 ∈ [β ] }
restrict [α]an [[α]
a
n ] = { x | x ∈ [α ], a@x ≤ n }
Table 4.1: Formal Definitions for Treaty Operations
α unionsq β = β unionsq α (4.1)
α u β = β u α (4.2)
(α unionsq β) unionsq γ = α unionsq (β unionsq γ) (4.3)
(α u β) u γ = α u (β u γ) (4.4)
α unionsq φ = α (4.5)
α u φ = φ (4.6)
α− φ = α (4.7)
φ− α = φ (4.8)
φ · α = α (4.9)
α · φ = α (4.10)
[φ]an = φ (4.11)
α− α = φ (4.12)
α unionsq α = α (4.13)
α u α = α (4.14)
These laws can be used to examine the correctness of different represen-
tations and implementations of treaty systems. We can prove these using
the formal definitions of treaty operations. Join and intersect are defined
directly using set theory, hence they inherit the properties of set operations,
thus:
(4.1) [α unionsq β ] = [α ] ∪ [β ] = [β ] ∪ [α ] = [β unionsq α ]
(4.2) [α u β ] = [α ] ∩ [β ] = [β ] ∩ [α ] = [β u α ]
(4.3) [(α unionsq β) unionsq γ ] = ([α ] ∪ [β ]) ∪ [γ ] = [α ] ∪ ([β ] ∪ [γ ])
= [α unionsq (β unionsq γ) ]
(4.4) [(α u β) u γ ] = ([α ] ∩ [β ]) ∩ [γ ] = [α ] ∩ ([β ] ∩ [γ ])
= [α u (β u γ) ]
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By definition of φ we also have [φ ] = {}, and  exists in every behaviour
set, i.e. [φ ] ⊆ [α ], thus:
(4.5) [α unionsq φ ] = [α ] ∪ [φ ] = [α ]
(4.6) [α u φ ] = [α ] ∩ [φ ] = [φ ]
(4.7) [α− φ ] = [α ] \ { x | x ∈ [φ], x 6= } = [α ] \Ø = [α ]
(4.8) [φ− α ] = [φ ] \ { x | x = b.Σ∗, b ∈ [α ], b 6= } = [φ ]
(4.9) [φ · α ] = { x | x = b1.b2, b1 ∈ [φ ], b2 ∈ [α ] }
= { x | x = .b2, b2 ∈ [α ] } = [α ]
(4.10) [α · φ ] = { x | x = b1.b2, b1 ∈ [α ], b2 ∈ [φ ] }
= { x | x = b1., b1 ∈ [α ] } = [α ]
(4.11) [[φ]an ] = { x | x ∈ [φ ] and a@x ≤ n } = {  } = [φ ]
And for the operations where both their operands are the same:
(4.12) [α− α ] = [α ] \ { x | x = b.Σ∗, b ∈ [α ], x 6= }
= [α ] \ ([α ] \ {  }) = {  } = [φ ]
(4.13) [α unionsq α ] = [α ] ∪ [α ] = [α ]
(4.14) [α u α ] = [α ] ∩ [α ] = [α ]
Hence all the laws are shown to be correct.
From the laws we may find that it is not beneficial to make a binary treaty
operation over a treaty to itself (αunionsqα and so on), except for the concatenate
operation that is not specified in these laws. However, to concatenate a
treaty with itself may cause more serious problems, as it will be explained in
Section 4.3. Hence we can make the decision that one should never use binary
treaty operations between treaties and themselves, as they only produce:
treaties that have no difference from the operands of the operations, an empty
treaty that does nothing, or treaties that break the assurance of behaviour
control schemes.
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4.2.4 A Use-Case Example
Consider an on-line voting system, where each voter can vote exactly once,
and can check the current result at any time. But in contrast to ordinary
voting, the organizer of this system would like to make vote actions available
only up to the deadline set by himself. If we think in terms of our behaviour
models, there will be three states and three types of actions in the behaviour
model for each voting treaty, as shown in Fig. 4.4 part a). Note that vote
and check are to be performed by voters, but the timeout action, which
will stop the system from accepting voting, is triggered by the timer in the
voting system. Thus this behaviour model needs to be separated into two
parts held by users and the timer respectively, as shown in Fig. 4.4 part b).
To construct this, the organizer of the voting can first obtain a com-
plete treaty α containing two types of action vote and check with unlimited
repetitions, and get the ordinary voting treaty by performing the restrict op-
eration [α]vote1 . Then there is a treaty with a single action timeout created
by restricting another complete treaty β containing unlimited timeout rep-
etitions to [β]timeout1 . These two processes are shown in Fig. 4.4 part c) and
d). The overall behaviour model of the voting, which is shown in Fig. 4.4
part a), is produced by performing a concatenate operation to the two re-
stricted treaties. In general, the operations of constructing the overall voting
behaviour model can be represented as:
[α]vote1 · [β]timeout1
With such a behavioural design, a voter can either vote or not, but once
the set deadline has passed, the kernel automatically performs this timeout
action to prevent any further votes being accepted.
Now the organizer of the election can further refine the treaties to produce
separated behaviours for voters and the timer. Let the treaty containing
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Figure 4.4: Behaviour Models for a Timed Voting System
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overall behaviour model shown in Fig. 4.4 part a) be denoted as γ. We can
produce the voter held treaty by:
γ − β
or simply
γ − timeout
Similarly, the timer treaty is produced by:
γ − check− vote
Hence treaties containing behaviour models that are shown in Fig. 4.4
part b) are generated. Note there are states that are not reachable using any
individual treaty in both behaviour models, but it is valid. Neither of voters
and the timer can solely complete the whole voting process, as they rely
on and are affected by each other’s actions, and this is exactly the desired
behaviour.
4.3 Novel Issues Generated by Treaties
Treaties extend vistas, and thus capabilities, in functionality, and so there
arise some new practical and theoretical issues that need to be considered.
It must also be remembered that treaties not only inherit positive attributes
from capabilities such as their flexibility and scalability, but also some nega-
tive issues such as the confinement and revocation problems that have been
introduced in Chapter 2, since treaties can also be propagated. Thus the
development of treaty systems needs to concern these together with their
particular challenges.
A main challenge that results from the new functionality of treaties is the
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duplication problem. Treaties require state descriptors to keep track of the
evolution of behaviours. This means that protecting the state information
is crucial. According to the rule of treaties, we must ensure that allowed
behaviours cannot be increased. A rollback of the current state may destroy
this rule in treaties that are access-repetition sensitive, which means in these
treaties there are types of actions that are only allowed to be performed with
a limited number of times. If the current state in such treaties is permitted
to be rolled back to one of the previous states, and between these two states
there are actions with limited repetitions, to rollback the current state to
the previous state means these actions can be performed once more. This
repetition is not counted to the assigned and limited access times, so the
rollback indirectly increases the possible access times, and this breaks the
rule.
Assume that a user is holding a treaty which allows him to perform a
read action exactly once. Then the challenge is how to prevent him from
‘validly’ performing more than one read by making a duplicate of the treaty.
If this treaty is a piece of data (bit-string) completely stored in an agent’s
memory, there is no way of preventing the holder from making a copy of it
before using it for any accesses. Then the holder can access the targeted
resource using the copied treaty, and keep the unused original piece so that
he can do the same thing next time he wanted to do read on the resource.
In this way this user gains an unlimited number of accesses, which clearly
breaks our rule.
The duplication problem does not only arise in this way. Taking another
example of the same treaty, assume the holder A sends (a copy of) his treaty
to another user B, and then uses his copy of the treaty to perform the action.
Later, B sends his treaty back to A, and A now has the original treaty again!
This example demonstrates that, even when they are held by different users,
treaties generated from the same original one must be maintained in the
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same state. The two cases of causing the duplication problem is illustrated
in Fig. 4.5
Figure 4.5: Two Cases that may Cause Duplication Problem
For similar reasons, if we were allowed to do a concatenate operation
between a treaty and itself as being mentioned in Section 4.2, and in the
treaty there are actions with limited number of executing repetitions, this
will cause a duplication problem and increase the valid number of executions.
This is the main reason why using binary treaty operations between treaties
and themselves should not be allowed.
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Moreover, the situation can be seen to be even more profound when
considering treaties which have been formed by the combination operations
outlined in previous sections. For instance, assume user A has received a
treaty from B which allows him to do a write then a read, and has received
another treaty from C that allows him to do a write then an execute, both
referring to the same resource. If A were to do a join of the two treaties
and send the result to D, and D were to request the kernel to perform a
write action, whose treaty, B’s or C’s, is the correct one to be synchronized?
Thus the concurrency issue also affects the design and construction of treaty
operations.3
Generally speaking, the most important new challenges of treaties are
related to states, and their management in a scalable fashion in a distributed
system. This is unsurprising, as behavioural states are exactly the novel
feature that treaties provide.
To solve such a problem, it seems that central control will have to act as
a key part. The crucial information including the current state shall be held
somewhere that is handled by the kernel, so that users cannot freely create in-
dependent copies without any restrictions. Although this may produce some
centralization problems, it still grants the property of treaty propagation,
and kernels do not need to identify all users, hence it is not an unacceptable
cost.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter the concept of treaties has been introduced. Treaties are ac-
cess control components that aim to support behaviour control in distributed
3This could be solved if we can distinguish the two write actions. If they are generated
from the same action, then there is no need for concern — both treaties of B and C should
be synchronized. If the two write are distinct, then D should tell the kernel which write
he wants to perform.
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environments. They use behaviour descriptors to capture the features of se-
quences, branches and terminations. The behaviour descriptors can show
different states that the represented behaviour may be in. There are four
basic characteristics that treaties hold, which are:
 refer to objects;
 provide access control information;
 not strictly bound to holders;
 can show different states in behaviours at different times.
The components that fit these characteristics can be regarded as treaties. The
definitions of the components in a treaty system are given in the chapter.
Treaties have associated operations that allow the holder of treaties to
refine the behaviours described by treaties. Five initial operations have
been suggested which are restrict, concatenate, intersect, difference and join.
There is a fundamental rule that treaty operations must obey: an agent can-
not increase the totality of behaviours defined by the treaties it holds. We
have used the idea of behaviour sets to show that the initially suggested op-
erations will not break this rule, and this work was also provided in previous
published paper [77].
The introduction of state has brought a new issue, called the duplication
problem. This problem is caused by making copies of treaties. Treaties may
have actions that are limited to certain access repetitions, and to make a copy
without any protection could increase the number of accesses and exceed the
allowance, which means the breakdown of access control. Any treaty system
must provide some kind of solution to the duplication problem to ensure its
integrity.
In this chapter only the abstract concepts of treaty systems have been
given, without any details of representing and implementing actual systems.
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These issues will be explained and illustrated in following chapters.
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Chapter 5
Representations of Treaties
The concept of Treaties introduced in Chapter 4 is quite abstract. It only
states the basic characteristics of treaties, and some implicitly defined oper-
ations. Any system or service that meets the requirements and enforces the
rule of treaties can be considered as a treaty system. There, nothing of how
to organize a treaty system was explained, and in practice treaties can be
represented in many ways, and there are a number of options for each treaty
component. In this chapter we will extend the abstract ideas of Treaties and
show how to convert these ideas into practice. The various choices or options
for the structure of treaties will need to be defined. Each option has its
strengths and weaknesses, so service providers can choose to combine differ-
ent kinds of representation depending on their requirements. We call a type
of structurally defined Treaty a Treaty Representation. Different represen-
tations of Treaties may have different characteristics which match different
cases. The representations of treaties may also affect the ways of solving the
duplication problem. These options and structures for representing treaty
systems will be examined in this chapter.
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5.1 Object Referencing
Options for the style of referencing concern the number of resources that one
treaty can refer to, and the relation and structures of these references. In the
abstract concept of Treaties mentioned in the previous chapter, each treaty
can only refer to one object, but it is valid to allow treaties referring to multi-
ple objects to upgrade the functionality of treaties. Hence there are a number
of different options. For example, we can choose to let each treaty refer to
only one object, as in the capability approach. This is a simple choice that
provides straightforward resource references, and no additional facilities are
needed to identify mappings between actions and objects. Conversely, this
choice means that it is not possible to operate on multiple objects, whether
simultaneously or non-simultaneously. If a user wants to do the same action
to many objects of the same type, he would need to pass treaties for each
of these objects separately which, in a large-scale distributed environment,
would limit efficiency. Possible applications to deploy this kind of treaty
referencing style would be systems where objects are independent and sepa-
rately accessed, such as in an office environment, having printers, scanners,
telephones and a clock with alarm. Assuming that none of these machines
needs to interact with others, then the treaties used to access them would be
separately dealt as well.
Another choice would be to allow treaties to refer to multiple objects, but
hold the behaviour descriptor separately (this would be similar to a set of
single-reference treaties). It would then be possible to deal with actions on
multiple target objects, but since behaviour descriptors are independent, they
are not capable of describing sequences of actions among different objects.
This choice is particularly suitable for applications that have a number of
objects of a same type. A good example when this referencing style could
be useful is the administration of a university. It holds data for a large
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number of students, and the profile of each student is of the same type.
The administration may want to change or update information for single or
groups of students, but would not need to do these in a particular order, and
thus no sequences among these student objects are required.
The third choice is to let a treaty be a ‘mix’. These treaties’ behaviour
descriptors would include actions on multiple objects, making it possible to
describe sequences over different objects. Clearly this is the most general, and
powerful option, as behaviours specified by the other two options can only
refer to a unique object. The disadvantage of this choice is that each action
in a treaty’s behaviour specification would have to identify the target object,
so the complexity of the structure would increase greatly. An example where
this referencing style could be applied is: assuming a user needs to transfer
a file from a public source to a local storage, but he would like to have a
check whether for any harmful contents are in the file before it is transfered
to the local storage. Treaties that grant this process will need to access three
targets of public source, the guard that provides the security check and the
local storage, and these actions are needed to be in sequence: first get the file
from the source, then go through the check, and finally save into the storage.
Only mixed-referencing of treaties can do this.
5.2 Behaviour Descriptors
Behaviour descriptors are required to define specifications of behaviours. Be-
haviours are defined as a group of actions that are combined in a certain order
and pattern, where an action is a single operation on a resource. Any logic,
mechanism or language that is able to represent behaviours of this form can
be a candidate in the behaviour descriptor part.
One obvious candidate is the finite-state machine (FSM), which is a
widely-understood concept. If FSMs were chosen to represent treaty speci-
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fications, then transitions in an FSM would represent actions. The FSM is
ideal for representing repetitions, sequences, branches and so on.
Regular expressions [22] would also be a convenient way of representing
treaty representations. As regular expressions, actions are represented by
characters, boolean ‘|’ for branching and ‘*’ for repetition. These two op-
tions will be discussed further and their implementations are introduced in
Chapter 6.
We may also use Process Algebras to represent behaviours, as Process
Algebras are designed for representing interactions, behaviours and com-
munications for independent processes, and have algebraic laws for process
operations.
Choices of behaviour descriptors can be made depending on different ap-
plications, as different options result in different effects.
5.2.1 Finite-State Machines
Using finite-state machines to represent the behaviour descriptors in treaties,
states are explicit. A behaviour descriptor represented by an FSM will have
a finite number of states (at least one), and a finite number of transitions
that represent accesses or actions. Each transition links two states (which do
not need to be distinct), one denotes in which state this action can happen,
and the other denotes which state the behaviour descriptor will be in after
this action happens. In an FSM representation of behaviour descriptors,
the current state is also maintained. This indicates the state of the holder of
this treaty by pointing to one of the states in the FSM represented behaviour
descriptor. As it has been mentioned, the FSMs used as behaviour descriptors
will not have any ‘accepting states’, as the access control scheme only cares
about whether the user’s required action is valid or not, but not when the
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actions should stop.1
The advantage of using an FSM representation is the precisely defined
states. They are directly contained as components in the behaviour descrip-
tors, so it is possible to add information to states to provide more control.
For example, we could mark some essential states, and the kernel would get
immediate notification when these states were reached. For example, imagine
in a house there are a number of electronic products, and there are treaties
controlling the power of these machines. States in treaties represents the
number of machines that are on. When there are too many machines turned
on, the fuse would blow. Hence when the specified state of the critical point
is reached, the kernel will be notified, and it can produce an alert telling
the danger. This idea also benefits the treaty combinator operation of follow
which will be introduced in Section 5.4.
5.2.2 Regular Expressions
In the Regular Expression (RE) representation, accesses or actions are rep-
resented by literal characters, or words, and we will use concatenation, al-
ternation and Kleene star to represent aspects of behaviours. There are no
explicit components that represent states in RE behaviour models. The cur-
rent state pointer in RE representations can be modelled by the ‘remaining’
expressions, and changes when the actions are performed and the expres-
sions are processed. For instance, the current state of an RE represented
behaviour can be ‘(read.write)|(execute)’ that means the holder can do
an execute, or a read then write, and after an action of read is performed,
the remaining expression and the current state is ‘write.’
Compared with the FSM representation, RE representation is easier for
human reading and writing/typing, especially when constructing the be-
1In other words, every state in a treaty is an accepting state.
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haviour model directly from a line of input. The main difference between
the two representations is the appearance of explicit state components. The
RE representation may have limits due the lack of identifiable states, as the
current state in the RE representation is denoted by the remaining expres-
sions. It is possible that there are two remaining expressions that are exactly
the same, but they came from two different paths (for example, ‘a.b’ that is
obtained from ‘x.a.b’ where x had been executed, and ‘a.b’ that is obtained
from ‘y.a.b’ where y had been executed) and should have different prompts
to users and kernels — in the RE representation it cannot distinguish the
two states (while the FSM representation can, as in that representation the
states are explicit). Despite this limitation, the RE representation is still a
good choice if the application does not require such functionalities. Besides,
no state components means simpler structures, and may allow treaties in
this representation to have smaller space requirements and faster processing
speed.
5.2.3 Process Algebra
Process Algebra (or Process Calculus) is the concept that is used for ‘the
study of the behaviour of parallel or distributed systems by algebraic means’
[3]. A process algebra is usually used for formally modelling concurrent
systems where multiple processes exist and interact. It provides the descrip-
tion for the consequences, communications and synchronizations for those
processes or agents, in algebraic ways. As the algebra laws are involved,
a process algebra is particularly applicable for analyzing and reasoning the
behaviours of processes in distributed systems. The most famous process
algebras are CSP [32], CCS [51], ACP [7] and pi-calculus [50].
Take CSP as an example. The Communicating Sequential Process is a
formal language for describing interactions in concurrent system, and is par-
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ticularly used for providing a way to model behaviours in distrbuted environ-
ment. If we use CSP notions, a simple read-once action can be expressed as
‘read→ Stop’, and a process of consecutive actions is made by having event
(action) appended to the head, e.g. ‘write → (read → Stop)’. Sequences of
processes uses symbol ‘;’, hence ‘P ;Q’ denotes ‘behaves as P until it termi-
nates, then behaves as Q’. The branch or choice aspect in CSP is denoted
by ‘u’ (internal choice) and ‘’ (external choice), and they are nondeter-
ministic and deterministic respectively. In context of access control oriented
branches, the deterministic ‘’ seems more suitable. The process of choosing
between left or right is expressed by ‘(left → Stop)(right → Stop)’. The
loop behaviours can be defined by recursive processes, e.g. ‘UPDATE =
read → (write → UPDATE)’. More tutorials for using CSP can be found
in Davies’s work [16].
CSP and Process Algebras are widely studied in many other researches
as an independent topic. Since they have relatively complete and complex
structures, it will take much more effort in learning and applying CSP in this
project. Therefore we will not look in deep for this option in the thesis.
5.3 Storage Location of Treaties
The storage location of treaties directly affects the solution to the duplica-
tion problem. As has been mentioned, if treaties are completely held in users’
(private) memory, it is possible that they could copy a treaty and gain unau-
thorized behaviours. We can choose to store treaties in a different location
to avoid this problem. Otherwise, treaties can be left in users’ devices, but
the critical data of treaties still needs to be protected by kernels.
A simple solution is to store treaties centrally. There would then be a
central storage for all treaties in the service provided, and users would only
hold references to these treaties. When users needed to access resources,
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they would present the references to the kernel, and the kernel would check
the corresponding treaties to allow or deny this access. Since only references
would be held by users, it would no longer be necessary to manage how users
copy and propagate them. However the side effect of this option is obvious:
the centralization management significantly restricts the scalability of sys-
tems, and the performance will heavily depend on the storage’s processing
speed, bandwidth, etc. It also becomes fatal if the central storage fails, where
all accesses will be denied.
The option of allowing users to hold treaties together with their cur-
rent state has the highest scalability, which is very attractive in distributed
systems. However, it has been shown in Section 4.3 that this could be dan-
gerous, as it might cause the duplication problem and destroy the behaviour
control provided by treaties. It is still possible to distribute (the major part
of) treaties to users though, providing that the critical information of these
treaties are in the control of kernels. It is clear that only the current state of
treaties needs to be protected from duplication or interference. Consequently
a promising compromise approach is to have this state managed by the ker-
nel, but the reference and behavioural specification parts made available for
(safe) user management.
5.3.1 Centrally Stored Treaties and References
A very simple way of solving the duplication problem is to take treaties away
from users completely. In this case, users cannot access treaties directly any
more, and thus are not able to make copies of treaties or send them to other
users. Treaties will now be held in somewhere that can only be accessed
by kernels. In return, users will only have references to those treaties. In
this approach, together with the behaviour descriptor and the current state
and the reference to the target object, there will be a fourth part in treaties:
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a unique identifier for each treaty. The identifier will also be contained in
treaty references held by users. Users can copy and send these references as
many times as they like, as treaties are still kept unique on the kernel side.
Fig. 5.1 shows an example of the structure of a treaty system that applies
the reprensentation of centrally stored treaties.
Figure 5.1: Structure of a Centrally Stored Treaty System
The process for preparing behavioural access control in such a model
would be:
 A user process sends a request to the kernel, to create an object.
 The kernel creates the object, and creates a ‘complete treaty’ (unlimited
accesses to all available action types for the object). This treaty will
be stored in the treaty container that is managed by kernels, and the
reference to this treaty, with the unique treaty identifier, will be given
to the creator of the object.
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 Then the creator can refine the behaviour descriptor by telling the
kernel how he will use treaty operations.
 The kernel then constructs a new treaty and stores it in the container,
and sends the new reference back.
 The creator can now send copies of this reference to other users, so that
they share the access rights to the created object.
The process of performing an action on an object would be:
 A user needs to send a request together with the treaty reference.
 Upon receiving the request, the kernel then uses the identifier contained
in the reference to locate the proper treaty, and checks whether the
requested action is valid according to the behaviour descriptor in the
treaty.
 If it is permitted, the action will be performed on the target object,
otherwise the kernel will send a denying message implying that the
action is not valid at this time.
This model is simple, but it has a weakness. In real cases it is quite possi-
ble that users do not know the current valid actions regarding the behaviour
descriptors. And without access to the treaties, they will have to either a)
send access requests without any knowledge of treaties or, b) send a query
asking what types of actions are available at the moment. In both cases, the
number of messages used for communication will increase.
However it needs to be mentioned that, in the case of option b, the re-
turned ‘available’ types of actions might not be granted when the users try
accessing objects. This is because there is another user who also has a ref-
erence to the same treaty, and he made an action using this treaty after the
kernel returns the available action set and before the first user makes the
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accessing request. This is the non-deterministic problem that many concur-
rent systems may suffer, where processes share common resources and may
disturb each other. A possible solution is to include locking scheme, and this
will be discussed in future work part of Section 8.2.
5.3.2 User-held Treaties and Treaty Entries
Figure 5.2: Structure of a Treaty System with Entry List
In contrast to the previous implementation which locates treaties on the
kernel side, this model lets users hold treaties, and kernels only keep a list
containing a number of entries, each of which stores the information for a
treaty. Treaties still have their unique identifiers, and they are contained in
entries as well, so that kernels can link them to treaties. Each entry consists
of two parts: in addition to the treaty identifier, there is the current state of
the related treaty. Although users can make copies and distribute treaties,
these copies still have the same identifier and current state, which prevents
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the duplication problem happening. This approach also indicates that for a
particular behaviour descriptor, all states are distinguishable. Each state is
tagged to show the identity that makes the state different from other states
in this behaviour descriptor. Fig. 5.2 shows an example of the structure of a
treaty system that uses the entry list option.
To initiate the creation process:
 A user sends a request for creating a new object.
 The kernel creates the object and the complete treaty for the user, and
an entry containing the identifier and the initial state for the treaty.
 The entry is added to the entry list, and the complete treaty is sent to
the creator of the object.
 The creator can use treaty operations to refine the complete treaty by
using treaty combinator operations.
 Before these refined treaties can be sent to other users, they must be
first sent to the kernel for registration.
 The kernel assigns identifiers to these treaties, and records them by
adding corresponding entries to the list.
 Now these treaties are ready for propagation.
If the user does not make the registration of their newly refined treaties to
kernels, the kernels will not hold any information of these treaties. When
users use these unregistered treaties to access objects, kernels simply deny
these requests.
The process to access objects in this approach:
 A user needs to send the request with the correct treaty.
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 When receiving the treaty in the request, the kernel first looks for its
entry, and then checks whether the current state represented in the
treaty is the same as represented in the entry.
 If the two states are the same, and the requested action is valid in this
state, the kernel will update both states in the treaty and the entry to
the new state according to the performed action, and return the treaty.
 If the two states are different, the kernel will synchronize them by
updating the current state in the treaty with the state in the entry,
and return this treaty to the user, notifying that this treaty has been
updated.
Such an approach reduces the communication messages to some extent,
as users can check the possible current state from treaties they are holding.
Though there may still be cases where users get outdated information when
the real state in the entry held by kernels has been changed by other users,
it is suitable for applications which have few users sharing objects. This is
also because when multiple users share the same object, the copy each of
them holds is a treaty. Larger number of users holding treaties means larger
consumption for overall space/memory, compared to references held by users
in the previous approach.
5.4 Operations and Executions
Treaty operations need not only be restricted to the five types given in Chap-
ter 4. Any useful operations could be included in treaty systems, as devel-
opers and service providers can introduce new treaty operations to fit their
own requirement, as long as they do not break the rule. Also, the way of
executing commands and operations can also be varied.
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5.4.1 More Operations
Here some possible additional treaty operations are suggested that could be
appended to treaty systems. There are certainly more available choices, but
these ones may be commonly used.
Interleave A frequently seen situation would be that a user may receive
treaties from multiple sources and would therefore hold a number of
treaties. It could be a mess if he need to perform an action, and tried
to find the correct treaty that will provide the corresponding permission
from the treaties he is holding. Hence it is more convenient if there were
an operation that combines treaties into one, with the result allowing
the holder to do all behaviours from the original treaties in parallel.
This cannot be realized by the join operation, which would only allow
one to choose one of the behaviours from the original treaties but not in
parallel. This interleave idea has been mentioned in Section 4.2 indeed,
and is the concept of shuﬄe. The shuﬄe idea was used for the largest
behaviour set that the result of any treaty operations should not go
beyond.
Obviously the result of interleave fits the rule of treaty operations,
as this operation produces the maximum behaviour set from the two
operand treaties, which is the equal set of the upper bound set.
Follow The follow operation is similar to the concatenate operation except
that, given the behaviours in two original treaties, concatenate allows
behaviours from the second operand treaty to act after any behaviours
from the first operand treaty, while the follow operation only allows
behaviours from the second operand treaty to act when behaviours from
the first operand treaty have reached a certain point. For example,
given two treaties, α: (read.write) and β: (execute), if we do a
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concatenate operation to α and β, the behaviour set of the resulting
treaty would be:
{, read, execute, read.write, read.execute, read.write.execute}
Now let us label one of the states in α to make it a ‘reach point’ state.
A reach point state is the state in which we can start performing be-
haviours from the second operand treaty of the follow operation. In
treaties resulting from the follow operation, the behaviours from the
second operand treaty will not be available to perform (unlike concate-
nate where behaviours from the second treaty can start at any time),
until the behaviours from the first operand treaty has reached the reach
point state. If we have defined a reach point state for α after the write
action, and we now do a follow operation to α and β, the behaviour
set of the resulting treaty would be:
{ , read, read.write, read.write.execute }
We use • to denote the follow operation, and the formal definition for
the follow operation between treaty α and β at state s in α is given by
(b1 . s denotes the behaviour b1 ends at state s):
[α • β ] = { x | x = (b1 . s).b2 where b1 . s ∈ [α ] and b2 ∈ [β ]}
This operation also fits the rule of treaty operations, as it is a special
type of concatenate. That is,
[α • β ] ⊆ [α β ], thus [α • β ] ⊆ [α · β ]
We may find the operation of follow more often used when we want to
refine behaviour models, as it can explicitly define the connecting point
between the two behaviour models. However to realize this operation,
the option chosen for behaviour descriptors must provide the function-
ality to support specifying the reach point. In the FSM representation
of behaviour descriptors, we can simply use state identifiers to do this.
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In the RE representation, we can only set the reach point as the ‘finish’
of the expression, where the behaviours in the expression have reached
their ends.
Loop This is the operation for creating loops of actions so that actions in
the refined behaviours can be potentially infinitely performed. In RE
representation style, if we have a treaty α: (read.write), the result
of loop operation is simply ((read.write)*). However this operation
must be specified carefully, because it may easily produce unlimited
actions and break the rule of behaviour control. The loop operation
can only be valid if the holder of the treaty already has a treaty that
provides the loop of actions which one wants to contain in the created
loop. At this stage of the research, we only allow this right of creating
loops with loop operation to open to users who possess the complete
treaty that allows them to do anything to the object with unlimited
number of repetitions.
5.4.2 Command Executions
We may also want the system to have different semantics for executing the
same command. For instance, assume there is a treaty that has references
to multiple targeted objects, such that all of them are allowed a read action
by this treaty. When presented with this treaty, a read request could mean:
to do a read on one of the objects, or to some of the objects, or all of the
objects. Developers can have different definitions for the executions of the
read command to realize the options above, depending on their preferences.
For instance, if a university wanted to change the grade information for all
of the students (since normally all students get upgraded at the same time),
it could choose to make an upgrade action that is executed to all objects of
student data simultaneously. However it might be the case that some of the
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students fail to pass examinations and will not get an upgrade. Hence here
the university needs to perform a degrade action to that group of student
after the upgrade is made. Actions executed to a single object are also
required, such as a ChangeInfo action can be performed if there is a student
pointing out that his record in the university system is wrongly inputted, and
this action should affect the student information object of only this student.
5.5 An Example of Organized Treaty Repre-
sentation
In this section a representation of treaties will be proposed. It is called the
‘Two-layered Referring FSM Representation’. This representation of treaty
systems has fixed choices to the options mentioned in previous sections to
give an complete example. In particular, it proposes a new option by com-
bining options given in Section 5.3, and provides a different solution for the
duplication problem.
As indicated by the name, the representation chooses finite-state ma-
chines as the behaviour descriptor, hence each time a valid action is per-
formed, an explicit state transition happens in relevant treaties. The five
treaty combinator operations of join, follow, intersect, difference and re-
strict are supported by this representation, and they will operate in ways as
defined. The key novelty of the Two-layered Referring FSM Representation
is shown in its storage location choice. In this representation, treaties are
neither stored centrally, nor completely distributed. Instead, there are two
different categories of treaties appearing in the system.
The first kind is called ‘source treaties’. These treaties are stored on the
kernel side, and each one can only refer to one object. Source treaties can
be accessed by kernels and the owner of the referred object (the creator of
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Figure 5.3: Two-Layered FSM Representation
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the object and those users who are allowed to share the high privilege by
the creator), but not any other users. Actions granted by the source treaties
will be represented by transitions in the finite-state machine acting as the
behaviour descriptor.
The other kind of treaties in the Two-layered Referring FSM Represen-
tation is called ‘combined treaties’. These treaties are generated from source
treaties, and they are distributed to users that are not the creator of ob-
jects. This is how this scheme of ‘Two-layered referring FSM representation’
transmits the permissions to other users.2 In combined treaties there are also
finite-state machines acting as behaviour descriptors, but combined treaties
do not directly refer to any objects. Instead, each transition in behaviour
descriptors of combined treaties refers to one transition in a certain source
treaty. When the holder of a combined treaty uses it to perform a permitted
action on the targeted object, both the corresponding transition in the com-
bined treaty and the referred transition in the source treaty will be processed.
Fig. 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the structure of this representation.
To initialize, a user will apply to the kernel to create an object. The kernel
creates the object, and returns a complete source treaty granting unlimited
repetitions for all actions that are available to this type of object. After
this, the creator of the object can use this complete source treaty to create
treaties with more limited behaviour models, using treaty operations. At
this stage all treaties created by the creator of the object are source treaties.
When a behaviour model is obtained as a result of a treaty operation, the
creator can store it in the storage of the kernel for distribution uses. Each
source treaty can be used as a model to build a combined treaty having
exactly the same finite-state machine states and transitions that represent
the behaviour. Each transition in the generated combined treaties refers to
2It is possible for the creators to send the source treaties out as well, in which case the
receiver of the source treaty also becomes an owner of the created object and is allowed
to refine the behaviours in the source treaty.
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Figure 5.4: Referencing Structure between Two Categories of Treaties
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the original transition in the source treaty.
After this, the creator can send out copies of combined treaties either
actively or by request, and these copies are built from the source treaties
this creator is holding. When other users have received multiple combined
treaties, they can use treaty operations to refine the behaviour model to
generate new combined treaties and send them out as well. This also indicates
that there may be transitions in the same combined treaty that refer to source
treaties of different objects, which means that the referencing style of the
Two-layered Referring FSM Representation is mixed multiple referring (see
Section 5.1).
The reason for this design is that however users make copies and prop-
agate to duplicate combined treaties, their transitions will still refer to the
transition in source treaties which are not duplicated. And after one user
performed an action transition, the other users will not be able to do the
same transition because the transition in the source treaty that grants this
action has been processed. In this way, the duplication problem has been
solved in this representation.
The five support operations will be implemented as follows:
 restrict limits the given type of action to a specified number for a source
treaty, and for a combined treaty one can choose to restrict the given
type of action only on one specified object or restrict over all objects
that are contained.
 The operation of join will return a treaty whose current state is a union
of the two original treaties, which means it will accept actions in either
original treaty at the current state.
 The operation of intersect returns a treaty that allows sequences of
actions that are valid in both original treaties. When operated over
combined treaties, only transitions from the two original treaties that
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refer to the same transition in a source treaty will be counted as com-
mon actions.
 difference does the operation in just the opposite way as intersect,
as common actions will be removed from the resulted treaty. And
the consecutive actions following these common actions will also be
removed, as they are no longer reachable from the current state of the
resulting treaty.
 The operation of follow connects the current state of the second operand
to the reach point state of the first operand. To perform such a con-
catenation, the first operand must have had specified a reach point
state.
The situation of concatenating two identical treaties will not cause the
duplication problem, since when concatenating a combined treaty to itself,
duplicated action requests will not be granted because of the two-layered
structure, and concatenating a source treaty to itself is completely legal be-
cause operations on source treaties can be only made by the owners of the
targeted object and the owners have full permissions which allow them to do
any number of accesses to that object.
Note that these binary operations are only valid between two source
treaties or two combined treaties, and the result treaty is of the same kind
as the original treaties.
These five are the fundamental operations that are provided by the Two-
layered Referring FSM Representation, but it is perfectly possible to add
other treaty operations into the model. However, as usual, the new operations
must obey the rule of treaty operations, and ensure that we can never get
source treaties from combined treaties.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter we have discussed the representations of treaties and treaty
systems. Treaties as proposed in Chapter 4 were general concepts, without
any details of actual systems and applications. In the design of treaty systems
there are several areas that give a number of options, and each option may
have different aspects from others such that they can be prefered to be chosen
in some cases. The parts that can be varied in different options are: the choice
of referencing styles, the choices of behaviour descriptors, the location where
treaties are stored, and treaty operations and ways of executing actions other
than the basic ones that were introduced in the previous chapter. Treaties or
treaty systems that have these parts defined are called treaty representations.
Developers and service providers can chooes to combined these options and
produce treaty systems according to their requirements.
 The choice of referencing styles means that one treaty can be set to refer
to only one target object, or separately referring to multiple objects, or
having a mixed referencing style such that treaties can define sequences
of actions over different objects.
 Behaviour descriptors in treaties can be chosen to be displayed in differ-
ent tools such as finite-state machines or regular expressions, or other
choices that can express the aspects of behaviours, and these choices
of behaviour descriptors may have effects on the performance of treaty
systems.
 The location where treaties are stored can affect the memory and band-
width occupation of those systems. We may choose to store treaties
on the kernel side, or to store them in the possession of users, but in
either case attention must be paid to solving the duplication problem
discussed in Chapter 4.
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 Developers and service providers can define new treaty operations and
choose the way of executing actions in their treaty systems, as long as
these decisions maintain the integrity requirements of treaty systems.
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 mainly address the inner structures of treaties, whereas
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 are more focused on the structure and processing of
treaty systems. Section 5.5 provides a example of a treaty system named
‘Two-layered Referring FSM Representation’, in which all options have been
defined. The discussion of solutions to the duplication problem was also
introduced in the previous published work [78].
Options to combine treaty representations have been discussed, and now
we can put these into implementation. How treaties are structured and how
the algorithms of treaty operations are designed will be introduced in the
next chapter.
Chapter 6
Implementation
In this chapter the implementation of treaty systems will be introduced.
These implementations cover the several options of treaty representations
discussed in the previous chapter. The main aspect of treaties that differs
from capabilities is their use of behaviour descriptors, hence this should be
emphasized. Two options for behaviour descriptors, finite-state machines
and regular expressions, have been chosen to be implemented and used for
testing. The implementation of other aspects of treaties is also shown in the
chapter.
Before any details are given, it is necessary to clarify that in this imple-
mentation, it is assumed that capabilities, vistas and treaties are unforge-
able by entities that hold these access control components. The encryp-
tion or other mechanisms that protect these components from being falsified
should be provided, and we presume this protection already exists. Hence no
anti-forging issues will be addressed in the implementation part. Similarly,
concurrency control is also out of the scope of the implementation. It is as-
sumed there are other concurrency control mechanisms provided. There is
some discussion about concurrency issues in Section 8.2.3.
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6.1 Implementation Overview
The implementation platform chosen is Java which is a widely-used object-
oriented language. As there are various kinds of entities in treaty systems
— kernels, users and files, and treaties — the object-oriented concept is
particularly suitable in this situation. Most terms that have been defined in
Chapter 4 are implemented as classes in Java.
The implementation of treaties is based on two representations that differ
in the choice of behaviour descriptor: finite-state machine (FSM) representa-
tion and regular expression (RE) representation. Being the essential part of
treaties, behaviour descriptors affect their structure and the design of algo-
rithms for treaty operations. The reason for choosing the two representation
is that they are well-understood in computer science, and are easy to ap-
ply and present. The actual structure of finite-state machines and regular
expressions in this implementation is coded by me instead of using any pro-
vided tools, as it gives a better customization and can have more adequate
evaluations when having experiments. We will introduce both of the repre-
sentations, including the required classes with their purposes, the fields and
methods in these classes, and the treaty combinator operations.
Other components to simulate treaty systems will also need to be im-
plemented, including kernels and users, and the objects that are used to be
accessed by users. There are also classes that are used for supporting eval-
uations, such as simple capabilities and vistas that will be used to compare
performance with treaties.
The simulation of a distributed environment will use the SimJava tool
[35]. SimJava is a toolkit for building working models of complex systems.
As its name indicates, this is a tool that is written in Java and supports other
Java applications. Using SimJava a framework of entities can be produced
in systems by implementing entities as subclasses of the defined classes in
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SimJava packages. There are a number of built-in methods that help to
simulate the communications among these entities. Functions for producing
evaluation reports are also included in this toolkit.
Instead of implementing the concatenate operation introduced in Chap-
ter 4, the follow operation introduced in Chapter 5 is chosen to be coded.
This is because that when refining behaviour models in treaties, the follow
operation is more useful and applicable than the simple concatenate opera-
tion, as the follow operation requires the ‘reach point’ component to connect
two behaviour models, and this makes the refining of the treaties more pre-
cise. Since we allow the empty behaviour in all treaties, if we perform a
concatenate operation, it means behaviours in the second operand can start
before any actions in the first operand are performed. In case of follow, it
can set the behaviours in the second operand starts only after actions in the
first operand has reach the defined point.1
6.2 FSMs as Behaviour Descriptors
The first implemented representation of treaty systems is chosen to use the
finite-state machine representation. In this representation, the behaviour
descriptors in treaties specify the steps of behaviours by a number of states,
and each valid action as a transition between states. There is a pointer
referring to the current state in the behaviour specified by the descriptor.
The class where object references are placed depends on referencing styles
(see Section 5.1). If it is single-object referencing, then a treaty can have
one reference which is placed in the class of Treaty. If it is multiple-objects
referencing, then each of the behaviour models in the treaty will have an
object reference. In our implementation, we choose the latter option which
1But remember that follow needs support from behaviour descriptors to specify reach
points, while concatenate is a more general expressed operation without special require-
ments. Hence concatenate would still be the basic treaty operation.
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is to place the object reference within the behaviour descriptor. Fig. 6.1
shows the structure of classes and methods in the FSM implementation in
UML style.
Figure 6.1: FSM Treaty classes in UML form
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6.2.1 System Components and Classes
An FSM style treaty consists of several components to be implemented by
classes in Java. Below these components are described:
ActionType This is the class that is used for different types of actions. Ex-
amples of action types could be: read, write, vote, etc. The field
variables in this class are unique, and it is the name of the type of
actions.
Model This class represents the behaviour descriptor part of treaties (recall
that the behaviour descriptor describes behaviour models). In the FSM
implementation the Model class contains a set of states, and a set of
transitions that connect pairs of states. It also contains the current
state pointer referring to one of the states in this Model instance. There
is another state pointer called openState which records the reach point
that connects other models when executing the follow operation.2
ObjRef This class is the object reference that is contained in treaties referring
to the target resource. There are two field variables: the pointer to the
target object, and the unique identifier which should be distinguished
from any other instances of ObjRef. The instances of the ObjRef class
are not only used for referring to resources, but are also available to
act as treaty references when required.
State This specifies states in the FSM representation for behaviour descrip-
tors. Each instance of the State class simply has one field variable
called stateID, which can help when indexing states. The stateID
only needs to be distinct in the same instance of Model class, but they
2In this implementation we assume we can only define one reach point in a behaviour
model at a time. If multiple reach points are needed, they are done with follow operations
one by one. This is not an optimized approach.
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are independent from states in other Model instances and hence can be
identical.
Transition An instance of the Transition class denotes an action applied
by users and a transition between two states in the FSM representa-
tion. Three field variables are contained in this class: the from and
to variables are two instances of the State class, and the aType is a
variable of ActionType class.
Treaty This class integrates all classes mentioned above to implement FSM
represented treaties. There are different options of referencing styles
that can be chosen. For the simple case of single object referencing,
an instance of Treaty contains one instance of Model which acts as
the behaviour descriptor, having one ObjRef instance for the target
resource and one current state pointer.
6.2.2 FSM Accessors and Access Methods
To get and set the field variables in these components, there are accessor
methods where needed. For different types of components, some additional
methods are defined according to their roles in treaty systems.
For ActionType, ObjRef, State and Transition classes, there are get
accessors for all the field variables, but there are no set accessors as these
values are fixed when the instances of these classes are created. There is also
a special method called isIdentical(), which takes an instance of the same
class as the parameter, and returns a boolean value identifying whether the
two instances are the same. Note that the two instances that are recognized
as identical by this method can be two distinct objects - just having the same
variable values.
In the Model class, the current state has both set and get accessors, as
the current state changes when valid actions are made. To add a state or
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transition into a model, there are the addState() and addTransition()
methods. The transiting() method takes a transition as the parameter,
and checks if this transition is identical to one of the transitions contained in
the model, and makes the transition happen if it is found to be valid. There
a also a cloneModel() method which returns a separate copy of the current
Model instance so that it can be used for another target object having the
same behaviour model.
The Treaty class contains the get accessors for the ObjRef instance,
and the method performAction() which grants or denies the requests of
user accesses. It takes the reference of the target object and the action
type of the access as the parameters, and returns a boolean value specifying
whether this action has been granted or not. There is another method called
checkValidity(), which also takes parameters of the target object and the
action type of the access, but it will check all reachable states to find available
transitions, and returns 0 if the action can be performed immediately, or 1 if
the action cannot be granted now but may be valid at some point in future,
or -1 if the action will never be granted.
6.2.3 Treaty Operations in the FSM Representation
The treaty combinator operations will interact with the behaviour specifica-
tions modelled in the Model instances. In the FSM style representation, the
states and transitions will need to be changed, and for the binary operations
combined states may need to be constructed which come from states in dif-
ferent treaties, and special transitions to connect them. To help in producing
such states and transitions, there is a class called StateCombiner that is used
for restructuring the behaviour specification.
In the StateCombiner class, there are two inner classes, which are called
MultilabelState and MLTransition. Instead of containing a stateID like
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the State class, MultilabelState use an array of integers such that one in-
stance can label multiple states from different treaties. MLTransition does
similar things as the Transition class, but variables from and to will have
the type of MultilabelState. The StateCombiner class has five other meth-
ods in addition to the constructor, they are:
addCombinedState() takes an array of integers as the parameter and adds
a MultilabelState instance into this StateCombiner instance.
addTransition() takes parameters of two arrays of integers to be the from
and to states and the ActionType instance to be the action type that
triggers this transition. It returns a boolean value to indicate whether
this action succeeds.
find() is a private method taking an array of integers as the parameter and
returning a boolean value indicating whether this combined state has
already existed in this StateCombiner instance.
visitAll() is a recursive private method that sets a flag for all reachable
MultilabelState instances. This is used for simplifying the model.
toModel() uses visitAll() to remove all unreachable states and then turn-
ing this StateCombiner instance to an instance of Model class.
With the help of StateCombiner class, these operations can be im-
plemented. In the Treaty class there are methods of restrictTreaty(),
joinTreaty(), intersectTreaty(), differenceTreaty() and
followTreaty() that do the processing of treaty operations. We assume
there are two operand treaties α and β, and the algorithms in pseudo-code
of the five treaty operations are given below.
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join - Two methods are related to the join operation. Their prototype in
Java is defined by:
public Treaty joinTreaty(Treaty other)
private void joinTraverse(Model m, State s, State l, State[]
from, StateCombiner sc)
The first method is used to do the join operation with another treaty,
and the second method is used to be recursively called to support the first
method. Here is the pseudo-code of these methods.
public Treaty joinTreaty(Treaty other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN NULL;
3 sc = new StateCombiner instance;
4 m1 = this.model;
5 m2 = other.model;
6 s1 = this.currentState;
7 s2 = other.currentState;
8 ss = a new combined state consisting s1 and s2;
9 add ss to sc;
10 joinTraverse(m1, m1.currentState, s1, ss, sc);
11 joinTraverse(m2, m2.currentState, s2, ss, sc);
12 get model m from sc;
13 RETURN new Treaty instance constructed with m;
private void joinTraverse(Model m, State s, State l, State[]
from, StateCombiner sc)
1 v = set of all valid transitions the start from s;
2 FOR EACH transition t in v
3 create the combined state ss consisting l and t.to;
4 IF (ss not in sc)
5 add transition with (from, ss, t.actionType) into sc;
6 create the combined state sto consisting l and t.to;
7 joinTraverse(m, t.to, l, sto, sc);
8 ELSE
9 add transition with (from, ss, t.actionType) into sc;
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follow - The prototype and the pseudo-code of the follow operation is
given below. The openState is the identified state that acts as the ‘reach
point’ state mentioned in Section 5.4.
public Treaty followTreaty(Treaty other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN NULL;
3 m1 = this.model;
4 m2 = other.model;
5 IF (m1.openState has not been set)
6 RETURN NULL;
7 sc = new StateCombiner instance;
8 FOR EACH state s in m1 and m2
9 add s into sc;
10 FOR EACH transition t in m1 and m2
11 add t into sc;
12 FOR EACH transitions t2 that (t2.from = m2.currentState)
13 add transition with (m1.openState, t2.to, t2.actionType)
into sc;
14 get model m from sc;
15 create a new treaty tr constructed with m;
16 RETURN tr;
Chapter 6. Implementation 109
intersect - There are also two methods that are used for performing the
intersect operation, and they are similar to those for the join operation. One
method is used to be called from the holder of this treaty, and the other one
is a recursive method to support the former method.
public Treaty intersectTreaty(Treaty other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN NULL;
3 sc = new StateCombiner instance;
4 m1 = this.model;
5 m2 = other.model;
6 add a combined state consisting m1.currentState and
m2.currentState into sc;
7 intersectTraverse(m1, m1.currentState, m2, m2.currentState,
sc);
8 get model m from sc;
9 RETURN new Treaty instance constructed with m;
private void intersectTraverse(Model m1, State s1, Model m2,
State s2, StateCombiner sc)
1 v1 = set of all valid transitions that start from s1 in m1;
2 v2 = set of all valid transitions that start from s2 in m2;
3 FOR EACH transition t1 in v1
4 FOR EACH transition t2 in v2
5 IF (t1.actionType is the same as t2.actionType)
5 sf = combined state consisting t1.from and t2.from;
6 st = combined state consisting t1.to and t2.to;
7 IF (st not in sc)
8 add st into sc;
9 add transition with (sf, st, t1.actionType) into sc;
10 intersectTraverse(m1, t1.to, m2, t2.to, sc)
11 ELSE
12 add transition with (sf, st, t1.actionType) into sc;
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difference - Again, two methods are used for performing the difference
operation, one method is used to be called from the holder of this treaty, and
the other one is a recursive method to support the former method.
public Treaty differenceTreaty(Treaty other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN this;
3 sc = new StateCombiner instance;
4 m1 = this.model;
5 m2 = other.model;
6 add a combined state consisting m1.currentState into sc;
7 v1 = set of all valid transitions that start from s1 in m1;
8 v2 = set of all valid transitions that start from s2 in m2;
9 FOR EACH transition t1 in v1
10 FOR EACH transition t2 in v2
11 IF (t1.actionType is the same as t2.actionType)
12 same = true;
13 IF (same != true)
14 sf = combined state consisting t1.from;
15 st = combined state consisting t1.to;
16 IF (st not in sc)
17 add st into sc;
18 add transition with (sf, st, t1.actionType) into sc;
19 differenceTraverse(m1, t1.to, sc);
20 ELSE
21 add transition with (sf, st, t1.actionType) into sc;
22 get model m from sc;
23 RETURN new Treaty instance containing m;
private void differenceTraverse(Model m, State s, StateCombiner
sc)
1 v = set of all valid transitions that start from s in m;
2 FOR EACH transition t in v
3 sf = combined state consisting t.from;
4 st = combined state consisting t.to;
5 IF (st not in sc)
6 add st into sc;
7 add transition with (sf, st, t.actionType) into sc;
8 differenceTraverse(m, t.to, sc);
9 ELSE
10 add transition with (sf, st, t.actionType) into sc;
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restrict - Two methods for the restrict operation:
public Treaty restrictTreaty(ActionType at, int times)
1 IF (times < 0)
2 RETURN NULL;
3 sc = new StateCombiner instance;
4 levels = size (times+1) array of states with distinct id;
5 m = this.model;
6 add a combined state consisting levels[0] and
m.currentState into sc;
7 FOR EACH state s in m
8 FOR 0 to (levels.length - 1)
9 add a combined state consisting levels[i] and s into sc;
10 visited = new empty collection of arrays of states;
11 restrictTraverse(m.currentState, sc, at, times, 0,
visited);
12 get model m from sc;
13 RETURN new Treaty instance containing m;
private void restrictTraverse(State cs, StateCombiner sc,
ActionType at, int times, int level, Vector<State[]> visited)
1 FOR EACH array of states v in visited
2 IF (v[0].id == level and v[1] is the same as cs)
3 RETURN;
4 sLevel = state with id of level;
5 thisCS = array of states consisting sLevel and cs;
6 FOR EACH transition t that (t.from = cs)
7 IF (t.actionType is the same as at)
8 IF (times > 0)
9 sNext = state with id of (level+1);
10 ss = combined state consist of sNext and t.to;
11 add transition with (thisCS, ss, at) into sc;
12 restrictTraverse(t.to, sc, at, times-1, level+1,
visited);
13 ELSE
14 ss = combined state consist of sLevel and t.to;
15 add transition with (thisCS, ss, at) into sc;
16 restrictTraverse(t.to, sc, at, times, level, visited);
Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3 gives a more direct view of how treaty operations in
the FSM implementation are performed.
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Figure 6.2: Illustration of Binary Treaty Operations
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Figure 6.3: Process of the Restrict Operation
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6.3 Regular Expressions as Behaviour Descrip-
tors
In the regular expression (RE) implementation, the behaviour descriptors
are represented in a different style. These no longer explicitly defined states,
and the actions are represented by expressions, which can be grouped to
form more complex expressions. The process of performing an action is like
matching regular expressions.
There are also treaty combinator operations in the regular expression
representation of treaties. Some of these operations can be realized quite
straight forwardly, because of the structure of regular expressions. This is one
of the advantages that the regular expression representation brings. Fig 6.4
shows the structure of classes and methods in the RE implementation in
UML style.
6.3.1 Classes and Field Values
There are some components in the RE representation that are exactly the
same as in the FSM representation of treaty systems. The main difference
is that we use expressions to replace the Model class. The classes and their
field values are as follows:
ActionType and ObjRef - same as those in the FSM representation. Used
to model the type of actions and the reference to a particular object.
Exp - this is the class that represents expressions. However it is abstract.
There is no constructor in this class and all instances of expressions
are constructed by its subclasses. In class Exp there is the field value
named expType, which indicates which type (defined by subclasses) this
expression actually is. There are also four static final constant values
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Figure 6.4: RE Treaty classes in UML form
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called ACCESS, CONCAT, ALTER and STAR and they represent the types
of expressions.
ExpAccess - a subclass of Exp. This class represents atomic expressions that
only contain one action. The only field value is named aType which
indicates the action type.
ExpConcat - a subclass of Exp. The instances of this class consist of a se-
quence of expressions. In other words these expressions are concate-
nated as a chain. The field value exps is a Vector instance which
contains a number of expressions in sequences. These actions can only
be performed consecutively.
ExpAlter - a subclass of Exp. This class also has exps which is a Vector
instance of expressions as the field value, but these expressions are
alternatives. One can perform any of the expressions in the vector.
ExpStar - a subclass of Exp. This class acts as the Kleene star in regular
expressions. The field value exp is an expression for a certain type of
Exp. Instances of ExpStar mean one can perform the expression zero
or more times.
TreatyRE - the treaty in RE representation. Two field values are contained
here, one is named bExp which is declared in the Exp class so that it
represents the behaviour descriptor, and the other is named oref which
is declared in the ObjRef class and refers to the target object.
6.3.2 RE Accessors and Access Methods
In the RE representation, fewer accessors are needed than for the FSM rep-
resentation. In class Exp and its subclasses, there is the getActionType()
method which returns the type of the expression instances. No set method
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for expressions are provided as the type of an expression is fixed when it is
constructed. There are no public ways to access inner expressions contained
in the Exp instances, but they can be accessed in the scope of protected
declaration.
The access() method is available for all Exp classes. It takes an instance
of ActionType as the parameter, and returns an expression that results from
this action. If the action is not valid, the returned expression has exactly
the same Java object reference as the original expression, hence the entity
that calls the access() method can simply use ‘==’ comparison to know
whether the access is granted or denied.
There is a findValidActions() method in all Exp classes that helps en-
tities to know what are the available actions. This method returns a vector
instance of ActionType.
Another two methods that act as key part in Exp classes are simplify()
and tokenizer(). The simplify() method does simplification on the spec-
ified expression. There are simplification rules that are only relevant to this
implementation of RE representation. These rules are:
1. If the inner expression in an ExpStar instance is also an instance of
ExpStar, then they are combined into one, e.g. (a∗)∗ = a∗.
2. If an inner expression in an ExpConcat instance is also an instance
of ExpConcat, then the inner sequence of expressions will join the se-
quence of the outer one, e.g. a.(b.c).d = a.b.c.d.
3. If an inner expression in an ExpAlter instance is also an instance of
ExpAlter, then the inner expressions will join the outer ones to be
chosen together, e.g. a|(b|c)|d = a|b|c|d.
4. In the ExpAlter class, the expressions will be simplified to be deter-
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ministic, e.g. (a.b)|(a∗) = a.(b|(a∗)).3
The tokenizer() method will read a String in a particular format and
return an instance of Exp. In case the input is not valid, it returns null.
In the TreatyRE class, there are getObjRef() and getExp() methods as
the accessors for the field values. There are also access() and
findValidActions() methods that communicate with the expression con-
tained in the treaty. The access() method in the TreatyRE class is different
from the one in the Exp classes as it also takes an ObjRef instance to execute,
and returns a boolean value to indicate the result of this access.
There is an issue that needs to be carefully considered in the implementa-
tion of RE represented treaties, which happens when there is an ExpConcat
object which is a string of expressions (Exp objects), and the first expression
(or first several expressions) is/are of ExpStar type. In normal cases when
we want to get the set of valid actions at the current state, only the first
expression needs to be examined, but in cases where Kleene star expressions
are at the head of the concatenations, it is necessary to examine the follow-
ing expressions as well, as the Kleene star expressions are allowed to ‘skip’
executing and pass to the next expression. For example, in an expression
(a∗).b, the valid action at the moment is not only a, but b as well. The issue
appears in cases where the findValidActions() or the access() methods
are called.
Hence in the implementation when we need to get the set of valid actions,
and the first several sub-expressions in the instance of ExpConcat is of type
ExpStar, we also need to check the following sub-expressions, which involves
the while loops.
3Note that these two expressions are not equal in the context of pure regular expressions.
But this simplification is valid in RE represented treaties, as we only care about the traces
of behaviours described by the behaviour descriptors. The behaviour sets provided by the
two expressions are the same.
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6.3.3 Treaty Operations in the RE Representation
In the RE representation of treaties, some of the operations become very easy
to realize. The behaviour descriptor part of the RE representation is formed
by combining expressions, and treaty operations are used for combining the
behaviour specifications in treaties. Hence there are operations that can
directly work on the expressions in these RE represented treaties.
join - The join operation works to perform a ‘boolean-OR’ like process.
To make a join operation in RE representations, we can simply create an
instance of ExpAlter from the expressions in the two original treaties.
follow - Similar to join, it can be simply made by creating an instance of
ExpConcat from the expressions in the two original treaties.
intersect - The main difficulty in designing the algorithm of intersection
in RE is how to deal with loops (Kleene stars). If we simply take common
actions from two expressions without any solutions for loops, it may become
non-terminating. In this implementation the loop issue is solved by keeping
track of processed common actions and the remaining patterns, and creating
ExpStar objects immediately when repeat patterns have been found.
public TreatyRE intersectTreaty(TreatyRE other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN NULL;
3 e1 = this.exp;
4 e2 = other.exp;
5 v1 = new empty Exp collection;
6 v2 = new empty Exp collection;
7 trace = new empty ActionType collection;
8 e = Exp instance resulted from e1.intersect(e2, v1, v2,
trace);
9 RETURN new TreatyRE instance constructed with e;
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public Exp intersect(Exp other, Vector<Exp> trace1, Vector<Exp>
trace2, Vector<ActionType> traceA)
1 v = new empty ActionType collection;
2 v1 = all valid actionType at this.currentState;
3 v2 = all valid actionType at other.currentState;
4 FOR EACH actionType a1 in v1 and actionType a2 in v2
5 IF (a1 is the same as a2)
6 add a1 into v;
5 IF (v.size == 0)
6 RETURN NULL;
7 result = new empty Exp collection;
8 depth = trace1.size;
9 FOR EACH actionType a in v
10 e1 = Exp instance resulted from this.exp.access(a);
11 e2 = Exp instance resulted from other.exp.access(a);
12 IF (e1 == NULL and e2 == NULL)
13 add a new ExpAccess instance constructed with a into
result;
14 ELSE
15 remove all elements whose index greater than depth in
trace1, trance2 and traceA;
16 FOR i = 0 to trace1.size
17 IF (e1 is the same as trace1[i] and e2 is the same as
trace2[i])
18 add new ExpStar instance constructed with traceA[0] to
traceA[i] into result;
19 found = true;
20 IF (found != true)
21 add e1 into trace1;
22 add e2 into trace2;
23 add a into traceA;
24 tail = Exp instance resulted by e1.intersect(e2,
trace1, trace2, traceA)
25 IF (tail != NULL)
26 add new ExpConcat instance constructed with new
ExpAccess instance of a and tail into result;
27 ELSE add new ExpAccess instance constructed with a into
result;
28 RETURN new ExpAlter instance constructed with all elements
in result;
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difference - The operation of difference between two RE represented
treaties is given by subtracting any valid actions in the second operand treaty
from the valid actions (and their followings) in the first operand treaty.
public TreatyRE differenceTreaty(TreatyRE other)
1 IF (this.reference != other.reference)
2 RETURN this;
3 cloned = an Exp object cloned from this.exp;
4 v1 = all valid actionType at current state of cloned;
5 v2 = all valid actionType at current state of other.exp;
6 FOR EACH actionType a1 in v1
7 FOR EACH actionType a2 in v2
8 IF (a1 is the same as a2)
9 result = this.exp.difference(a1);
10 RETURN new TreatyRE instance constructed with result;
public Exp difference(ActionType at)
1 SWITCH (expType of this.exp)
2 CASE (ExpAccess):
3 IF (this.exp.actionType is the same as at)
4 RETURN NULL;
5 ELSE RETURN this;
6 CASE (ExpConcat):
7 IF (this.exps[0].difference(at) != this.exps[0])
8 RETURN NULL;
9 ELSE RETURN this;
10 CASE (ExpAlter):
11 FOR EACH Exp e in this.exps
12 IF (e.difference(at) != e)
13 remove e from exps;
14 IF (elements removed from exps)
15 RETURN new ExpAlter instance containing remaining
expressions;
16 ELSE RETURN this;
17 CASE (ExpStar):
18 diffed = this.exp.difference(at);
19 IF (diffed == this.exp)
20 RETURN this;
21 ELSE IF (diffed == NULL)
22 RETURN NULL;
23 ELSE
24 RETURN new ExpStar instance constructed with diffed;
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restrict - The problem with implementing the restrict operation in the
RE representation is that: if we apply the restrict to the expression with an
ExpAlter instance followed by other expressions, and the sub-expressions in
ExpAlter instance return different remaining number of actions, then when
we keep doing the restrict to the following sub-expressions, we cannot de-
cide which number to use. To solve this, there is a support class called
ExpRestrict, which contains two Vector instances, one stores the expres-
sions that were applied with the restrict operation, and the other stores the
remaining number of actions after the respective expressions in the former
vector are restricted.
public TreatyRE restrictTreaty(ActionType at, int times)
1 result = ExpRestrict instance from this.exp.restrict(at,
times);
2 ea = new ExpAlter instance constructed with elements in
result.exps;
3 RETURN new TreatyRE instance constructed with ea;
public ExpRestrict restrict(ActionType at, int times)
1 SWITCH (expType of this.exp)
2 CASE (ExpAccess):
3 es = new empty Exp collection;
4 is = new empty integer collection;
5 IF (this.actionType is the same as at)
6 IF (times > 0)
7 add this into es;
8 add (times-1) into is;
9 ELSE
10 add this into es;
11 add times into is;
12 RETURN new ExpRestrict instance with (es, is);
13 CASE (ExpConcat):
14 current = new ExpRestrict instance constructed with (at,
times);
15 FOR EACH Exp e in this.exps
16 tempRes = new empty ExpRestrict instance;
17 FOR i = 0 to current.exps.size
18 result = e.restrict(current.exps[i],
current.remain[i]);
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19 add all pairs in result into tempRes;
20 current = tempRes;
21 RETURN current;
22 CASE (ExpAlter):
23 result = new empty ExpRestrict instance;
24 FOR EACH Exp e in this.exps
25 tempRes = e.restrict(at, times);
26 add all pairs in tempRes into result;
27 RETURN result;
28 CASE (ExpStar):
29 tempRes = this.exp.restrict(at, times);
30 result = new empty ExpRestrict instance;
31 FOR i = 0 to tempRes.exps.size
32 IF (tempRes.remain[i] == times)
33 add (new ExpStar instance with tempRes.exps[i], times)
into result;
34 ELSE
35 next = (new ExpStar instance with
this.exp).restrict(at, tempRes.remain[i]);
36 For j = 0 to next.exps.size
37 ea = new ExpConcat instance constructed with
(tempRes.exps[i] and next.exps[j]);
38 add (ea, next.remain[j]) into result;
39 RETURN result;
It is important to note that, after the treaty operations, these newly
formed expressions must be simplified before use. But it is not necessary
to call the simplify() method each time an operation is performed. To
produce a required behaviour specification it usually takes several steps of
treaty operations, and the simplify() method can be called only once, after
these operations have been done.
6.4 Other Components
To build the system for evaluation, there are several other components to
be implemented. The SimJava tool was used for simulation of a distributed
environment with a number of kernels and users or processes.
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6.4.1 Classes and Field Values
Kernel - simulating kernels or middleware or servers in the system. This
class extends the Sim entity class in SimJava, and acts as an entity
that can send and receive messages with other entities. The class in-
cludes field values of inport and outports. They are instances and
collections of Sim port which is the port provided by SimJava used for
message communications. The Sim entity class also contains a name
field that is used to identify instances, and Kernel inherent this value.
User - simulating the users or processes who send action requests in the
system. This is also a subclass of Sim entity, with a name String as
its identifier. In instances of User, there is only one outport and one
inport of Sim port, as a user will only communicate with one kernel
that processes requests. When the system is running, the inport of a
user is bound to one of the outports of its kernel, and the outport of the
user is bound to the inport of that kernel. There is another field value
named treaties of type Vector, and which stores all the treaties this
user entity holds.
Request - the class that simulates the access request from a user to a kernel.
The field values it contains are: a String of name as the identifier of
the sender of the request; an instance of ObjRef indicating the target
object of this access; an instance of ActionType indicating the type of
action in this request; and a treaty that the user used for granting this
access.
Capability - the class used to model the Capability approach of access con-
trol. This is used to compare with the treaty approach. There is an
ObjRef instance indicating the target object, and a Vector instance
named rights indicating the types of permissions granted by this ca-
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pability instance.
Vista - the class used for model the Vista approach of access control. This
is also used for comparison with treaties. Each instance contains a
Vector instance storing a number of Visibility instances.
Visibility - represents the visibilities in the Vista approach. There are two
field values of a ObjRef instance referring to the target object and a
ActionType instance indicating the names to be accesses in the target
object.
Other Classes - These classes are used for simulating objects and resources
to be accessed. They depend on applications hence there are no fixed
definitions of classes. But they will contain the ObjRef instance as the
identifier of the object, and the corresponding access methods for those
access types.
Here are simple examples in pseudo-code to show how kernels behave
when receiving messages from users in capability, vista and treaty systems.
kernels behaving in capability systems
1 m = message received from user u;
2 SWITCH type of m;
3 CASE CREATE:
4 create object o according to u’s requirement
specified in m;
5 create capability c refer to o;
6 send c to u;
7 CASE ACCESS:
8 a = required action specified in m;
9 c’ = capability attached in m;
10 IF a is valid by c’;
11 perform the access action;
12 send result to u;
13 ELSE send denying message to u;
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kernels behaving in vista systems
1 m = message received from user u;
2 SWITCH type of m;
3 CASE CREATE:
4 create object o according to u’s requirement
specified in m;
5 create vista v refer to o;
6 send v to u;
7 CASE REFINE:
8 obtain vistas v1 and v2 attached in m;
9 perform the vista operation specified in m
to v1 and v2 to get v3;
10 send v3 to u;
11 CASE ACCESS:
12 a = required action specified in m;
13 v’ = vista attached in m;
14 IF a is valid by v’;
15 perform the access action;
16 send result to u;
17 ELSE send denying message to u;
kernels behaving in treaty systems
1 m = message received from user u;
2 SWITCH type of m;
3 CASE CREATE:
4 create object o according to u’s requirement
specified in m;
5 create complete treaty t refer to o;
6 send t to u;
7 CASE REFINE:
8 obtain treaties t1 (and t2) attached in m;
9 perform the treaty operation specified in m
to t1 (and t2) to get t3;
10 send t3 to u;
11 CASE ACCESS:
12 a = required action specified in m;
13 t’ = treaty attached in m;
14 IF a is valid by t’;
15 perform the access action;
16 update the current state in t’;
17 send result and updated t’ to u;
18 ELSE send denying message to u;
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6.4.2 Methods in Classes
There are only a few methods in these classes as we only need to simulate
the relevant part when running the system, hence functionalities that exceed
the scope of treaty systems are abandoned.
In the Capability class, there is the getObjRef() when capabilities are
used for accessing. The access() method is certainly implemented to deal
with the checking validity process. The other method in this class is called
reduce() which takes an instance of ActionType, and removes it from the
set of rights.
In the Vista class, there is the addVisibility() that adds a Visibility
instance into this Vista instance. The checkVisibility() method checks
whether a visibility is in this instance. Four methods sumVista(),
differenceVista(), intersectVista() and productVista() represent the
vista combinator operations.
In the Kernel class, there is a method named addPort(). This method
is performed when a new user joins the kernel, and the corresponding port
communicating with the newcomer is created. The body() method overrides
the method inherented from Sim entity, and this is the main body to process
communicating messages and events.
The User class is similar to the Kernel class as they are both subclasses of
Sim entity, and there is the body() method for processing communications.
No addPort() method is contained in this class as in our simple system
model, we define that one user needs to connect to only one kernel, and the
port has already been declared as a field value.
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6.5 Summary
We have introduced the implementation of treaty systems. The implemen-
tations described were split into two main parts: one is based on the FSM
representation of the behaviour descriptors in treaties, and the other is about
the RE representation. The two representations have clearly different ways
of describing behaviour models, hence they also affect how treaty operations
act in their representations.
In the FSM representation each treaty contains one behaviour model that
refers to a particular object. In the model there is a collection of states
and a collection of transitions. Each transition has a label for the action
type that causes this transition to happen. There is a special class called
StateCombiner which supports the simplification of the FSM representations
of the model and many treaty operations. To perform an action, the holder
of the treaty needs to specify the object reference and the action type of the
access together with the treaty. A successful access will cause the current
state pointer in the model to change its target.
In the RE representation, we also let one treaty refer to one object, and
the regular expressions that act as the behaviour descriptors are organized in
a tree structure. Expressions are divided into four categories of single actions,
concatenations, alternations and Kleene stars (loops), the latter three kinds
contains other expressions. In this way expression trees are constructed. To
perform an action, the holder of the treaty also needs to specify the object
reference and the action type of the access. This shows that FSM and RE
representations only differ in the structure of behaviour descriptors, and they
can be used in exactly the same way. A successful action may cause the
expression tree to change its shape.
The implementation of other components in the system such as kernels
and users are also introduced in this chapter. With these components and
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the implemented treaties we can carry out experiments to simulate the treaty
systems and get evaluation results. These will be explained in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 7
Evaluation
Since treaties are proposed mainly for behaviour control in distributed en-
vironments, the evaluation for this project will cover the following aspects
of treaty systems: the correct behaviour control ability, time for kernel(s) to
deal with requests, and resources in systems that apply the treaty approach.
Being an escalation of a security mechanism, the correct behaviour control
ability is still essential as if it leads to fault behaving, the escalation would be-
come useless. The time cost would be a major concern from the users’ point
of view as we do not want the access request to be executed slowly. The re-
source occupation is also one of the major concerns, from kernels, users and
bandwidth’s point of view. Hence the evaluations in this chapter concentrate
on how time and space consumption changes when different factors change.
The evaluations also show how the treaty combinator operations perform,
and the comparisons between FSM represented treaties and RE represented
treaties.
Most data shown in figures are average values resulted from multiple rep-
etitions of experiments. The error bar in graphs are the standard deviation of
those experiments. For data that are shown in more than one figure for dif-
ferent observations, only the figure that is more appropriate (may be clearer
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for view or better comparison) is chosen for displaying the error bar.
7.1 Evaluation of Behaviour Control
Behaviour control is the major functionality that treaties provide, compared
to access control by capabilities. Therefore, to ensure that treaties will give
permissions and grant accesses correctly, especially in cases where the du-
plication problem may appear, it is essential to examine the correctness of
accesses with treaties, within a large number of requests and user actions
that may lead to the duplication problem. These user actions include using
copied treaties to try to gain more permissions, and propagation of treaties
among users letting multiple users hold the same treaty to request the same
actions.
A system has been built to test the behaviours controlled by treaties.
There are a large number of users that behave legally, and a small number
of malicious users who try to perform actions that are not allowed by the
system. These illegal behaviours may contain action types that do not exist in
the set of valid actions for the given resource type, or repeatedly performing
those actions which only allowed a limited number of times. The proportion
of malicious users to overall users will be varied to examine whether any
illegal behaviours are granted by the systems. Table 7.1 illustrates the result
for this evaluation. We count the number of valid actions that are rejected
by the kernel, the invalid actions that are accepted by the kernel and the
actions which are allowed to perform only limited numbers of times but are
requested more times than the limitation. The proportion of malicious users
has changed from 1% to 100%, and the fault number of all three categories are
0, which means there are no fault behaviours allowed by the treaty system in
our test. This experiment result does not guarantee the implemented system
is faultless, but it shows that the treaty system behaves correctly and satisfies
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Malicious users Valid actions Invalid actions Limited actions
in the population being denied being allowed being over-performed
1% 0 0 0
10% 0 0 0
50% 0 0 0
100% 0 0 0
Table 7.1: Behaviour Control Evaluation when Malicious Users Exist
the security requirements of behaviour control to some extent.
7.2 Evaluation of Time Costs
The time taken for verification is also an important criterion for evaluating
treaty systems. Although treaties provide more powerful controls than simple
capabilities, users will not be happy if the response time for their requests
becomes too long. We need to make comparisons between the performance
of treaties and capabilities, particularly on time and resource consumption.
It is unavoidable that the verification time for treaties is longer than the
verification time for capabilities, as it takes more steps to check permissions
in treaties. Moreover, the time for verification should be significantly less
than the time for accessing files, for both treaties and capabilities.
As the structures of behaviour descriptors in finite-state machine repre-
sentation and regular expression representation are different, the action pro-
cessing and treaty operations also have different execution methods. Hence
the efficiency of the two representations is worthy of evaluation. We will build
the evaluation system for FSM-style treaties and RE-style treaties under the
same conditions, and calculate and compare the creation time, refinement
time and execution time for these two representations. We will also compare
the operating times for each type of treaty operations.
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7.2.1 Access Time for Capabilities, Vistas and Treaties
In this evaluation we will test and measure the access times for all the ac-
cess control components that have been introduced in this work: Capabilities,
Vistas, Treaties of FSM representation and Treaties of RE representation. To
keep a fair contest, all the four candidates are implemented in simple struc-
tures with only their necessary components and no additional functionalities
described in Chapter 5 are applied, and they all grant the same permissions.
In the implemented capabilities there are only single references to the target
object and a set of action types that a capability grants. In the implemented
vistas there are a set of visibilities, each of which contains one reference to
the same target object and one action type for accessing the object. The sim-
ple treaties in this part of the evaluation take no account of the duplication
problems, and they are only single-object referencing. The FSM represented
treaties only have one state, and a number of transitions that represent those
action types. The RE represented treaties contain a Kleene star expression
over an alternation expression, which consists of all valid action types.
Since each single access only takes a very short time that is hard to
observe, to get a clearer view on how the time consumption of using the four
candidates to access objects grows, we do the test a large number of times
and evaluate the overall time for each candidate. Fig. 7.1 shows the time
consumption of the access time using Capabilities, Vistas, FSM represented
treaties and RE represented treaties, where there is only one valid action type,
and the request for access is granted (i.e. the requested action is the same as
the valid action type in these access control components). Fig. 7.2 shows the
time consumption of the access time using the four control components with
only one action type, but this time we try an invalid action (which is different
from the valid action type in the components). Finally Fig. 7.3 shows the
time consumption of the access time using the four control components with
ten valid action types.
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Figure 7.1: Times for successful accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM
Treaties and RE Treaties with a Single Action
Figure 7.2: Times for failed accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM Treaties
and RE Treaties with a Single Action
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Figure 7.3: Times for successful accesses, for Capabilities, Vistas, FSM
Treaties and RE Treaties with 10 Actions
From these observation we see that the time consumption for using capa-
bilities and visibilities are almost the same, while vistas take sightly more.
In cases with fewer actions, the RE representation takes even less time than
capabilities to grant or deny a request, and the time for the FSM represented
treaties is the most of the four. However, when the number of action types
increases, the time cost of using treaties in RE representation increases signif-
icantly, and it becomes higher than the FSM representation. The capability
and vista approaches have a steady time cost for accesses, where the number
of action types does not have a big effect on them.
The time cost of successfully accessing using treaties is apparently higher
than the time cost of failure to access by treaties. This shows that in treaty
approaches, when a valid action is made, extra time is needed for changing
the current state in behaviour models in treaties.
This evaluation is purely about the validation time for the candidates.
It is worth mentioning that the significance of the time difference between
treaties and capabilities/vistas can be much reduced if we include the prop-
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agation time of messages, which means there will be another value added to
the validation time, and in most cases the propagation time is much bigger
than the validation, and hence makes the difference of time consumption
between treaties and capabilities/vistas discountable.
7.2.2 Time Cost for Stages of Using Treaties
We examine the time consumption for each stage of using treaties in this
part: creating treaties, refining treaties and accessing with treaties. Treaties
are initially created to be complete treaties which contain all the types of
action available to the created object, and with an unlimited number of
repetitions. We call this the ‘creation’ stage. The ‘refinement’ stage is the
part when creators of objects use treaty combinator operations to refine
behaviour models to get new treaties. In the ‘access’ stage users can use
treaties distributed by the creators of objects to access those objects.
We will test the time consumption of the three stages in a use-case. The
use-case of creating voting treaties was selected. In this case, the kernel
will originally create a complete treaty containing action types of vote and
check, and refine it to fit the required specification using treaty operations
(as shown in Fig. 7.4). Then a behaviour of ‘check-vote-check’ will be
performed using this refined treaty.
Figure 7.4: Refining a Complete Treaty
Fig. 7.5 and Fig. 7.6 show the time consumption for each of these steps
in the FSM and RE representations. Since it takes a very short time to
complete such a process for one treaty, we did the test for a number of times
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Figure 7.5: Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in FSM Representation Treaties
Figure 7.6: Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in RE Representation Treaties
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and observed the total time. The horizontal axis represents the number of
processes that were performed, and the vertical axis represents the total time,
in milliseconds. From the result we see that the creation and access of treaties
takes similar times and is relatively low, while the refinement takes most time
of the process. However it should be noted that the refinement of treaties
is usually an ‘infrequent’ job that only happens a few times, compared with
accesses which will happen frequently during a long period of time.
Fig. 7.7 shows the time consumption of these stages in both representa-
tions to give a comparison view. We can see in this figure, the time consump-
tion in the FSM representation is much greater than the time consumption in
the RE representation. The time consumption is greatly affected by the use
of classes implementing the Collection interface in Java. In the implemen-
tation of the FSM representation, states and transitions are implemented as
concrete objects as they were addressed in Section 6.2, and they are stored in
collections (in our case, instances of the Vector class). On the other hand,
in the RE representation there are no collections used in some types of ex-
pression classes. It takes much more time to access the elements in these
collections using their indexes (positions in the collections) than to directly
access an object with its explicit reference. This produces the difference
between the performance of the FSM and RE representations.
However, Vector is a list-type of collection, as it stores elements as a chain
of objects, and accesses them using an index. There is the alternative of using
hash-type collections, which use chosen keys to access the stored elements,
and hence improve the efficiency of accessing elements so decreasing the
time consumption. It is possible that the time consumption of RE treaties
in Fig. 7.3 would be reduced greatly and become lower then that of FSM
treaties. But there are two things that need to be mentioned: first, using hash
tables requires each stored element to have an identifiable key, which could
mean adding extra data for elements that have no identifiable attributes;
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Figure 7.7: Time Consumption for Creation, Refinement and Access Stages
in both Representation
second, there are places where we cannot change list-type collections to hash-
type collections, e.g. the chain of sub-expressions that are connected in the
relationship of concatenation in the RE representation.
7.2.3 Evaluating Treaty Combinator Operations
In this part we will evaluate the time consumption of treaty operations for
both FSM and RE representations. We do the evaluation not on the simple
number of run times for each operation, but instead, we change the number of
actions in treaties, in other words, the evaluation is based on the complexity
of the treaties’ behaviour models.
Fig. 7.8 shows the time comsumption of operations in the FSM repre-
sented treaties. In each evaluation the number of actions in the behaviour
model used for the test is increased by 20, and we run the operation for 20
times. From the figure it can be seen that in FSM represented treaties, the
time for all the five operations does not show big differences, which means
the efficiency for FSM operations is quite steady.
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Figure 7.8: Time Consumption for Operations in FSM represented Treaties
Figure 7.9: Time Consumption for Operations in RE represented Treaties
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Figure 7.10: Time Consumption for Operations in RE represented Treaties
Figure 7.11: Time Consumption for Join in RE represented Treaties
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Fig. 7.9 shows the time comsumption of operations in RE represented
treaties. We use same factors as those used in the FSM evaluations, in
which the number of actions is increased by 20 and 20 runs of tests are
evaluated. This figure shows that the join, follow, difference and restrict
operations take very little time to be performed, but the operation of intersect
is obviously much slower. We saw in Section 6.3.3 that the algorithm for the
intersect operation needs several collections to execute, and they are accessed
frequently. Moreover, for each intersect operation, every sub-expression is
needed to be compared with all the previous sub-expressions, all of which
need to access the collections, and this gives the complexity of the algorithm
nearly O(N2). This causes the intersect operation in the RE representation
to take far more time.
Since it is to difficult to observe the trend for the join, follow, difference
and restrict operations in RE representations in the resolution we used for
FSM evaluations, we have to change the factor to redo the tests. Here we
increase the number of actions in RE represented treaties by 100 and run the
operation for 100 times in each test. Fig. 7.10 shows the time comsumption
of operations follow, difference and restrict.
For the operations of join, we have to change the resolution again. Fig. 7.11
shows the time comsumption of operation join, where we increase the num-
ber of actions in RE represented treaties by 10000 and run the operation
for 10000 times in each test. It shows that the time consumption for the
operation of join in the RE representation is not affected by the complexity
of the behaviour models in treaties.
Fig. 7.12 – 7.16 show the direct comparisons of the five operations between
FSM and RE represented treaties using the same factor. For the operations
of join, follow, difference and restrict, the RE representation performs far
better than the FSM representation. The only exception is the intersect
operation, for which the FSM representation gives a better performance.
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Figure 7.12: Time Consumption for Concatenate Operations
Figure 7.13: Time Consumption for Join Operations
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Figure 7.14: Time Consumption for Intersect Operations
Figure 7.15: Time Consumption for Difference Operations
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Figure 7.16: Time Consumption for Restrict Operations
Again, the collections used in the intersect in the RE representation are
accessed more frequently than those in the FSM representation, which results
in this exception. Moreover, the time consumption for the intersect operation
of RE treaties shown in Fig. 7.14 would not be benefited from changing
Vector collections to hash-type collections, since the algorithm of intersect
in the RE representation relies on the sequences of actions so only list-type
collections are valid.
7.3 Evaluation in a Distributed Environment
In this part of the evaluation our treaty systems are applied to a simulated
distributed environment. In the evaluation, kernels and users are all entities
in the system, and they can communicate with other entities using messages.
With this environment we will carry out evaluations to examine the per-
formance of models aiming to solve the duplication problem introduced in
Section 4.3. We will also examine the scalability of these implementations in
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the context of such environments.
7.3.1 Models towards Duplication Problem
We have proposed several models that are designed for solving the duplication
problem, and they will be examined and compared for their performance with
respect to time and memory consumption. The treaties and related compo-
nents were implemented in Java, and they were installed in the discrete event
simulation tool SimJava [35] which is also used for network and distributed
environment simulation. The voting system use-case is chosen again, and the
behaviour model is as shown in Fig. 7.4.
Figure 7.17: Example of Voting System Structure
An example of system structure of the evaluation is shown in Fig. 7.17.
There are kernels and users whose communications include requests from
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Figure 7.18: Time Consumption while Number of Users Changes
Figure 7.19: Time Consumption while Number of Kernels Changes
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users and acknowledgements from kernels. There is an object counting the
voting result, which can only be accessed by kernels. When processing, each
user starts by sending a request for creating a treaty to the kernel. Upon
reception of the treaty (or treaty reference), the user chooses to perform the
vote action, and the kernel then changes the result in the counting object,
until all requests have been made and processed. This process is repeated
for models of centrally stored treaties, entry lists and Two-layered Referring
FSM Representation as were proposed in Section 5.3 and 5.5, as all the three
models provide solutions to the duplication problem.
Fig. 7.18 shows the time consumption when using one kernel to process
different numbers of voters in our three models. The horizontal axis is the
number of voters and the vertical axis is the total time consumed in mil-
liseconds. From this it can be observed that the time spent by the central
store approach and the entry list approach is almost the same, while the
two-layered treaty approach takes about 40% more. Fig. 7.19 shows the time
consumption when using multiple kernels to process 100 voters in the three
models. The result for multiple kernels does not show a great improvement
from single kernel processing, as the total amount of work processing the
common voting resource by all kernels is nearly unchanged
Fig. 7.20 shows the memory consumption when having one kernel and
one user, with one treaty. The vertical axis is the memory consumed in
bytes. In the central store approach most of the memory consumption lies
on the kernel side, while in the entry list approach the memory use is shared
equally between users and kernels. The two-layered treaty approach costs
more memory space than the other two. Fig. 7.21 shows the memory con-
sumption when there are 10 kernels and 100 users with 100 treaties. We can
see that in the central store approach, the kernel load is very heavy, as it still
takes more memory than the sum of user space. In the entry list approach,
most of the memory consumption goes with user processes. Again the two-
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Figure 7.20: Space Consumption Comparison in Small Scaled Case
Figure 7.21: Space Consumption Comparison in Larger Scaled Case
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layered treaty approach costs more memory space than the other two, but it
should be noted that this approach has the extra functionality of modelling
sequences among multiple objects (as discussed in Section 5.1).
7.3.2 Scalability of Treaty Systems
The scalability of treaty systems is a very important measurement in this
project, as treaties are proposed to work in distributed environments where
the number of users is dynamic and varies widely. However, there is a prob-
lem before any evaluation can be carried: the concept of scalability has not
yet been formally defined as common knowledge. Scalability in parallel com-
puting was originally used to describe the enhancement of processing speed
when multiple processing units are involved in a computation. But as the
area of parallel and distributed computing develop and applications and ser-
vices in these fields keep varying, there is no single, commonly agreed way of
measuring the ‘scalability’ for different systems.
Thus it is best to define the meaning of scalability in treaty systems to
carry out any evaluations. The chosen measurement of ‘scalability’ shall
be suitable for illustrating the performance of systems when the number
of kernels and users changes in distributed environments. We define treaty
system to be ‘scalable’ if the consumption of key measurements of the system
increases linearly (or approximately linearly) while the population in the
system increases linearly, which means the ratio between increased amount of
consumption for resource and the increased amount of entities in the system
is approximately constant.
There are two major measurements that are selected for evaluating the
performance of treaty systems, they are the additional resource on kernels
and the processing time for requests. The additional resource on kernels is
mainly used for storing state information of treaties, as it has been explained
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that there must be some information stored by kernels to solve the duplication
problem. Ideally, the resource should have a linear increase with the number
of behaviour models, and we can certainly call treaty systems in this situation
‘scalable’. However, in practice it is always hard (or impossible) to reach the
ideal case. We will need to trace the trend of increases of resources in kernels
as the number of users increases (assuming each of them sets up a separate
treaty).
The processing time for requests is another measurement that can reflect
the performance of treaty systems in distributed environments. In this part
of evaluation we would like to examine the average processing time for each
request, which is calculated by having the overall processing time divided by
the number of requests. We will trace changes in this average value when
users and requests keep growing to evaluate the scalability on processing time.
This differs from the evaluation in the previous section which compares the
processing time among capabilities, vistas and treaties. In the ideal case, the
average processing time for a single request should be relatively steady while
the number of users changes.
Fig. 7.22 shows the average time per message when users in the system
increase. We still do the comparison among the three models that aim to
solve the duplication problem. The messages that are counted in this exper-
iment includes the request from users to kernels for obtaining a treaty, the
request from users to kernels for accessing the object using the treaty, and
the acknowledgment message from kernels to users that reply to the former
two kinds of requests. We can see from the figure that as the experiments
go, there are fewer factors that disturb the evaluation result, so the aver-
age time consumption for processing each message becomes steady in later
stages. This shows that when the number of users increases, the processing
time for requests is not much affected, which implies good scalability in time
consumption for our proposed models.
Chapter 7. Evaluation 153
Figure 7.22: Average Time Consumption per Message
Figure 7.23: Kernel Memory Occupation
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Fig. 7.23 shows the kernel space occupation when the number of users
in the system increases. From the result we can see that all the three mod-
els have a linear increase in the space occupation on the kernel side. This
also shows that treaty systems have a good scalability in additional resource
consumption on kernels.
Note that in these approaches, the entry list approach has the lowest
central resource occupation among the three, which seems to be the better
choice in the context of distributed environments. But the central memory
occupation is not the only consideration in such environments, and there is
the other factor of bandwidth consumption. For the network load, the more
the data transfered, the heavier the bandwidth consumption would be. For
the three approaches, the centrally-stored treaty method would only require
the entities wanting to access resources to send treaty references, which are
relatively small in size. The entry list approach and the two-layered FSM
treaty approach both need the treaties to be sent, hence they have much
higher bandwidth consumptions. Generally speaking, the developers and
service providers need to balance their trade-offs. If the application is more
critical in server load, it is advised to choose the entry list approach; if
the application requires lower bandwidth occupation, the centrally stored
approach seems to be the better choice.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter several tests have been made and illustrated. We have shown
how effectively treaties can control the behaviours by denying invalid re-
quests from malicious users. The validation of candidates of access control
and behaviour control approaches are evaluated by their validating time.
Evaluations of the time consumptions for different stages when using treaties
has also been given, and it was shown that the refinement stage consumes
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more time than the creation of complete treaties and using treaties to access
objects. However, refinement of treaties, unlike accesses, does not happen
frequently.
We also made evaluations on treaty operations when the treaties have
varied their number of actions. Some interesting results showed that the
performance of operations in the FSM representation are almost the same,
while those of the RE representations perform much better most of the time,
except for the case of the intersect operation. The join operation in the RE
representation is approximately constant time as it is not affected by the
number of actions in the operand treaties.
These results also show that the time consumption of these implementa-
tions is greatly affected by the number and frequency of user of the collection
data structures. To improve the performance of systems it is suggested to
minimize using collections when possible.
The models for solving the duplication problem that were introduced in
Chapter 5 were also tested in distributed fashion. The number of users and
kernels in the system were varied and the evaluation of the performance for
the three models demonstrated the differences among those models. It shows
that the entry list representation has the lowest kernel load. Meanwhile these
models are also used to evaluate the scalability of treaty system. According
to the result, treaty systems show a good scalability in both time and space
consumption. The overall result illustrates that treaties are feasible to be
applied in the control of distributed environments.
All parts of the research have been shown in the thesis. Now we can
have an overall view and point out any potential topics that could be further
developed in the treaty systems in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Access control is an essential concept in the security administration process.
It guarantees the resources are accessed by the correct entities. Traditional
access control approaches use Access Control Lists that provide centralized
control, as it stores the access information with objects. However this ap-
proach is not very applicable in distributed environments, where the popula-
tion of users changes frequently, and it is expensive to maintain such dynamic
user lists. Capabilities provide another solution to dynamic access control.
This is achieved by having capabilities as concrete components which are
held by users. Users can then pass these capabilities to other users to dis-
tribute the permission for accessing objects. The kernels no longer need to
store the access control information, but only need to check the validities of
capabilities when they are presented by users. Hence capabilities are more
suitable in distributed environments.
But capabilities are still quite simple in their structure. There are only
sets of rights that grant unlimited repetitions of valid actions — there is
no way of specifying subsequences of actions. In the real world there are
cases where the actions must happen in particular orders, and there are
cases where some actions only have a limited number of repetitions. We
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call these behaviours. Thus, it is beneficial to investigate behavioural control
approaches in distributed environments. We propose the ideas of Vistas and
Treaties in this thesis which provide the behaviour control.
8.1 The Proposed Work and Contributions
Vistas are extended from the idea of capabilities. This approach is suggested
because the complexity of objects in modern applications has evolved, and
there may be a variety of field values and methods inside an object. In vistas
there are sets of visibilities, each of which is a reference to the targeted object,
together with the permission to access one of the field values or methods in
the object. This means in a vista, there might be visibilities that refer to
different objects. An important functionality that is provided in the Vista
approach is the vista combinator operations that can be used to change the
set of visibilities contained. In the content of this thesis, the product is a
particularly important vista operation, since it produces a chain of actions,
which provides an aspect of behaviour specifications. However there are
more aspects that the idea of behaviour carries and vistas cannot embody
all of these. Thus further development is needed, which leads to the idea of
treaties.
Treaties are also an extension of capabilities and vistas, which are even
better in modelling behaviour specifications. In treaties there are behaviour
descriptors that can record the states of the defined behaviour model, and
a pointer to the current states. The current state changes when actions are
successfully performed using a treaty. There are also combinator operations
in treaty systems to refine behaviour specifications while these treaties are
being held by users, and this makes treaties a dynamic behaviour control
approach that is suitable for distributed environments. However it needs
to be kept in mind that there is a rule in treaty systems for those treaty
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operations, which is: an entity cannot increase the totality of behaviours in
the treaties it holds. The rule must be kept by all treaty operations. We
have proven our proposed basic operations will not break this rule using the
concept of behaviour set.
A new issue has been brought about by the new aspect of states in treaties,
and that is called the duplication problem. In treaties there might be actions
with a limited number of repetitions, and if there are no security mechanisms
provided, to duplicate such a treaty could increase the number of allowed
actions. The duplication problem may be caused by copying of treaties,
passing treaties among users and doing a concatenate operation of a treaty
to itself. Any systems that implement treaties must provide solutions to the
duplication problem to avoid this issue. A number of models that aim to
solve the duplication problem have been proposed in the thesis.
In treaties and treaty systems there are several parts that are not fixed,
and implementation options are provided to developers and service providers
such that they can choose to create a treaty system that best fits their require-
ments. These parts include: object referencing style, the way to represent
behaviour descriptors, the location for storing treaties, additional treaty op-
erations, and ways for executing commands. A complete example of a treaty
system that has every part fixed has been presented in the thesis.
Treaties and relevant components in treaty systems has been implemented
in Java, including methods for treaty combinator operations. The imple-
mented systems were used to evaluate the performance. We compared the
time consumption for accessing resources with various access control com-
ponents, and tested the time consumption of different components of these
implementations. The performance of treaty operations in the FSM and RE
representations are compared to show the differences in the two representa-
tions. We also proposed three different models that aim to solve the duplica-
tion problem, and evaluated their time and space consumptions. They were
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also used to evaluate the scalability of the implemented treaty systems. The
result showed that these treaty systems scaled well, and hence are suitable
for distributed environments.
The main contributions of this thesis are:
 Developing the concept of vistas and treaties, how they are structurally
evolved from capabilities, and why these evolutions are beneficial.
 Investigating operations that could be used to combine vistas or treaties
to form new access control and behaviour control specifications. These
operations provide the functionality of letting users refine their be-
haviour specification after the vistas or treaties are produced, and hence
further increase the dynamic control of accesses and behaviours.
 Providing a proof of the correctness of treaty operations using the idea
of behaviour set to show that refining treaties with treaty operations
will not destroy the safety of behaviour control.
 Pointing out the new issue called the duplication problem that arises
with the behaviour control approaches, and suggesting possible solu-
tions that could solve this problem. The performance of the candidates
of solutions for the duplication problem were also tested and compared.
 Demonstrating that treaty implementations can have various options
that developers and service providers can choose for treaties and treaty
systems to satisfy their particular requirements.
 Presenting implementations of vistas and treaties. We realized the
functionality of behaviour controls and the refinement of behaviour
specifications using treaty operations, have evaluated the correctness
of behaviour control using treaties, and have evaluated the time con-
sumption for the components of treaty implementations. Finally we
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evaluated the scalability of treaty systems to show the practicality of
treaties.
8.2 Future Work
Using treaties to provide behaviour control in distributed systems is a novel
approach, and there are still many areas that can benefit from further re-
search. Here we will introduce some of these areas.
8.2.1 Behaviour Pattern Matching
In Section 4.2 we have shown the treaty combinator operation restrict, which
can produce new behaviour models in which the occurrence of the given type
of action has been limited to a certain number. This is useful when cases
need to have some actions restricted in repetitions, but at this stage, it only
concerns actions. From time to time we can find situations where it is not
a single action that needs to be restricted, but a sequence of actions. For
instance, one is allowed to smoke, and to go to the petrol station, but it
is never allowed to go to the petrol station and smoke. This indicates that
we may need to restrict a pattern of behaviours instead of single actions.
The same can be applied to other treaty operations, such as observing the
common pattern of behaviours in two treaties (the intersect operation), or
eliminating a certain pattern of behaviour from the treaty (the difference
operation). All these need pattern matching mechanisms.
It is difficult to perform a pattern matching in FSM represented treaties,
and not an easy task for RE representations either (there are various works
towards RE matching [64, 34, 4], but keep in mind that in our context it also
includes sub-expression matching). But it is still worth applying some effort
to finding a pattern matching mechanism for treaties with good efficiency,
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due to the reasons addressed in the previous paragraph.
8.2.2 Reducing Parameters of Target Object
The efficiency of using capabilities and treaties in programming languages is
also an issue that could be explored. In a treaty based system, to access any
object there must be one or more attached treaties as parameters. Assuming
an object-oriented language, a possible expression for accessing an object
(this access can be a method to read or write the field values of the object)
could be:
o.m(p, t);
where o stands for the object (in fact it is the reference to this object),
m is a method or function, p some parameters and t is the treaty used to
access o. Assume t is a single-object reference treaty (recall the structure of
treaties: they consist of references to objects and the behaviour descriptors).
Therefore we can see that in the line of code above, the reference to the
object o occurs twice (as o, and in t), which causes a redundancy since the
duplication of reference is unnecessary. Thus, a more elegant line of code
representing the same meaning could be:
t.m(p);
There still exists other duplication in the line of code. The method m, as-
suming it is an operation like read or write, is the action which the holder of
treaty t thought to be valid. That is, the method m is already contained in
the treaty t, which means m also appears twice. At the moment it is not fair
to say this is also a redundancy, since there may be more access types than
m in the valid actions in t, and an indication of which action to be chosen is
needed. But, can this duplication be simplified as well? The answer might
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be yes, but modifications might be needed to the structure of treaties.
8.2.3 Non-deterministic Problem and Semaphore-like
Scheme
As mentioned in Section 5.3, in treaty systems the non-determinism problem
also appears. Since there might be multiple users requiring to perform actions
on the same object, and in treaties there are sequences of actions, it is possible
that the access control information being held by users is outdated. Assuming
the treaty α allows its holder to do actions a then b to its targeted object
o, and copies of α are held by users u1 and u2. u1 believes he can do a
to o and sends this request to the kernel, but the kernel denies his request,
because u2 had already done the a action to o. The kernel then tells u1 he
can do only b now. However, even this acknowledgment from the kernel is
possibly outdated. When u1 then asks for the action of b, the kernel may
still reject it, because after the former acknowledgment from the kernel and
before the second request from u1, u2 has made the request of b in front once
again. Not providing solutions to this problem may cause a great number of
invalid request and the denying acknowledgment messages, which could take
up significant system resources.
We may possibly improve the situation by adapting the semaphore ideas
[18, 19]. The binary semaphore can be simply applied in treaty systems by
flagging the resource to be ‘occupied’ while a user want to access it. Taking
the example in the previous paragraph, before u1 makes the actual request
of action, he can first asking the kernel ‘what can I do to o’. The kernel then
flags object o, and tells u1 that the action b is available right now. Then u1
can either make this valid action or waive this occupation of the resource.
Whatever the choice he makes, the kernel will release the flag for o after the
communication with u1 comes to an end.
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This scheme, however, faces problems that ordinary semaphores have,
such as users occupying resources without releasing them. Thus further re-
search needs to be done to find a satisfiable solution.
8.3 Coda
The vista and treaty ideas have been proposed in the thesis. They evolved
step by step, aiming to provide finer descriptions of actions and better se-
curity control in distributed environments. But behaviour controls in such
environments is still a topic that is deep enough for other approaches to fill.
The effort illustrated in this thesis takes a small step in this direction, but
has sketched an initial picture to be worked with.
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